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RENT DETERIANATION AND ITS TAX
TREATMENT
LESTER R. RUSOFF*
Payments between stockholders and corporations and by lessees to third per-
sons, leases witth options to buy and leasebach arrangCnents involve possi-
bilities of tax avoidance. Professor Rusoff e.xamzines the rclevance of the
substance over form, step-transaction and business purpose doctrines to
these and other situations.
The tax treatment of a number of situations depends on whether an
item is rent or something else. Some of these situations involve possi-
bilities of tax avoidance. Therefore, the writer will discuss the relevance
of various doctrines, such as that preferring substance over form, the
business purpose test, and the step-transaction doctrine, which appear
commonly in discussions of tax avoidance. The doctrine preferring sub-
stance over form seems to be basic, since its point is merely that a
transaction which appears to be of one type and to qualify for a partic-
ular type of tax treatment may in reality be something else. This doc-
trine has become commonplace; the difficult problem is deciding what is
the real character of the transaction.' It may or may not be the same
as its form. The other doctrines should be employed to ascertain
whether the form and substance of a given transaction are the same. The
step-transaction doctrine may be applied, for example, to conclude that
what is in form several transactions is in substance one, or vice versa.-
The business purpose test may be used to find that acts in the form of a
reorganization are not such in substance2
The application of these doctrines is not simple: Some criteria are
necessary to decide when they should be used. Generally, it appears
that the step-transaction doctrine applies if, and only if, the parties
would not have entered into the earlier steps without the later ones.s
The business purpose test is properly applicable where the language
of the statute, or at least the aim behind the enactment of the statute,
* Professor of Law, Montana State University School of Law.
1. Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation S9 n204 (1st Serics 1937).
2. Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation 203 (2d Series 1933).
3. For a statement that the business purpose and stp-tranaction doctrinv3 "often
merge into a Eind of substance-over-form approach," scc Bitther, Federal Income Ta.ation
of Corporations and Shareholders 392 (1959).
4. One writer concludes that no general principles run cons-istenly through the tax
avoidance decisions and that the only useful approach is to look for patternm in particular
areas. Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51 'Mich. L. Rev. 1021, I03I-
52 (1953). The present writer suggests that it may still be ucful to try to formulate
general principles which the courts should follow.
5. Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation 245 (2d Series 193S).
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makes a business purpose essential. Thus, it applies under the reorgan-
ization provisions because they were enacted to permit a change in the
form of carrying on a business without tax liability.' It should apply
when the question is whether an expenditure involved a "business" ex-
pense.7 These situations may be contrasted with situations in which
there is no manifest intent of Congress to limit a tax advantage to com-
mercial transactions. For example, interest paid on a real debt seems
properly deductible, regardless of the purpose of the transaction.'
The writer does not maintain that reference to these approaches can
make the decision of tax avoidance cases simple. Such cases call for a
judgment as to what the parties to a transaction or Congress had in
mind. One intangible involved is a tendency of the courts to construe
an ambiguous statute against the taxpayer when his chief purpose was
tax avoidancef When questions of fact are involved, courts use rules
as to burden of proof to get judges or juries off the fence in doubtful
cases; in the decision of a difficult question of law, a value judgment,
such as a feeling that attempts at tax avoidance should be frustrated,
is likely to be used for the same purpose. We seem to be dealing,
ultimately, with attitudes as to how economic rewards should be dis-
tributed, or to what extent a citizen's "take-home pay" should de-
pend on the adaptability of his affairs to tax avoidance. In such a
situation, reaching agreement is inevitably difficult.
I. PAYMENTS BY LESSEE TO THIRD PERSONS AS TAXABLE INCOME
TO LESSOR
The problem of whether payments by a lessee to third persons is tax-
able income to the lessor arose largely in connection with long-term
leases of property of railroads and telegraph companies made in the
latter part of the nineteenth century. Many such leases provided that
the lessee should pay the lessor's taxes, interest on the bonds of the
6. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a).
8. Taxpayers have purported to borrow money to buy notes, with the expectation of
paying more interest on the loan than the anticipated gain on later sale of the notes. The
Government has disallowed deduction of the interest, on the grounds of lack of reality of
the debt and lack of a business purpose. Rev. Rul. 94, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 53. The ultimate
result of the litigation in this area appears uncertain. 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation
§§ 26.01, 26.13a (Zimet & Diamond rev. 1954); 2 Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income,
Gift and Estate Taxation § 37.09(6) (1954). Some emphasis continues to be placed here
on the business purpose test. Diggs v. Commissioner, CCH 1960 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
(60-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) ff 9584 (2d Cir. July 5, 1960). See the dissenting opinions in L. Lee
Stanton, 34 T.C. No. 1 (April 7, 1960).
9. Miller, Tax Plans That Failed, U. So. Cal. 3d Tax Inst. 1, 5 (Brown ed. 1951);
Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation 153 (1st Series 1937).
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lessor, and certain amounts to the stockholders of the lessor. Some pro-
vided that the lessee should pay amounts due on the principal of a debt
of the lessor secured by the leased property. The purpose of these pro-
visions was to avoid office expenses, not taxes.",
Payments to Stockholders
In the light of the history of the interpretation of our income tax
statutes, it now seems obvious that generally payments by a lessee to
the stockholders of the lessor will and should be taxed to the lessor. A
contrary result, if applied consistently, would permit corporations to
divert various types of income, not merely rent, to stocholders, so as
to avoid the corporate income tax. This possibility of avoidance was
seen in early litigation dealing with the problem." It was held, more-
over, under both the Corporation Tax Act of 1909' and the Income Tax
Act of 1913,'" that such payments were includible in the income of the
lessor. The courts thought that the payment was made for the use of
the corporate property and to the stoclholders because of their status
as such. Consequently, the question of whether the lessee paid the money
to the stockholders directly or only indirectly through the corporation
was found to be only a matter of method, not substance.'4
Although this holding seems theoretically sound, it raised practical
problems as to how the tax could be collected. The lessor was unlikely
to have money to pay the tax.'i As will appear below, the courts found
legal difficulties in the way of collecting the tax from the lessee or the
stockholders of the lessor. The existence of these difficulties led to
some doubt as to the soundness of the original decisions.'6 Ultimately,
however, the Supreme Court upheld those decisions.'7
Between the early and late decisions, there is an interesting change
in arguments. At first, the taxpayers argued that these transactions in-
volved an assignment of future rents from the lessor to its stockholders.9
This argument was rejected on the ground that the payments were to be
10. Rens:eer & S.R.R. v. Irwin, 249 Fed. 726, 723 (2d Cir.), cert. dcnicd, 24G6 U.S.
671 (1913).
11. Blalock v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 246 Fed. 337 (5th Cir. 1917).
12. Corporation Tax Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 33, 36 Stat. 112; BlalocI: v. Gcor'ia Ry. &
Elee. Co., supra note 11. See also Anderson v. Morris & E.R.R., 216 Fcd. 03, Q0 (2d Cir.
1914).
13. Income Tax Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 2G(a), 33 Stat. 172; Rcnwclacr & SoRR. v.
Irwin, 249 Fed. 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 671 (1918).
14. Blalock v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 246 Fed. 337, 3SR-9,0 (5th Cir. 1917).
15. Rensselaer & S.R.R. v. Irwin, 239 Fed. 739, 746 (N.DJN.Y. 1917).
16. United States v. Western Union Tel. Co., 50 F.2d 102, 103 (2d Cir. 1931).
17. United States v. Joliet & C.R.R., 315 U.S. 44 (1942).
1S. Blalock v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 246 Fed. 37, 3M3 (5th Cir. 1917).
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made to those persons who should be registered stockholders when the
installments become due. When the problem finally reached the Su-
preme Court, Lucas v. Earl" had been decided, and therefore it was
argued for the Government that the transaction involved an anticipatory
assignment of income, with the assignor remaining liable for the tax.20
In connection with long-term leases of railroads, the lessee often
bought enough of the stock of the lessor to gain control.2 ' This raised the
problem of whether the lessor was taxable on amounts payable, under the
lease, by the lessee ta itself as a stockholder of the lessor. Although
the lessee typically did not in form make such payments, the lessor was
held taxable on the amounts that might have been paid.22 In a case in-
volving the liability of a lessee-stockholder as a transferee of the lessor,
the Second Circuit treated the obligation of the lessee as suspended in
respect to those shares of the lessor which it held.2 3 Later, however, the
same court distinguished that decision on the ground that it did not
relate to the problem of the liability of. the lessor.2 4
There has been a district court decision that, if the lease provides
that the lessee shall make no payments with respect to the stock of the
lessor held by the lessee, no income is imputed to the lessor, except as to
payments the lessee makes to other stockholders. 26 The rationalization
for this decision was that the provision which measured the rent pay-
able by reference to the outstanding stock expressly excluded stock
owned by the lessee. Gold & Stock Tel. Co. v. Commissioner0 was one
of the leading cases taxing the lessor on amounts which the lessee did
not pay with respect to stock of the lessor which it owned. The lease in
that case did not expressly exclude such stock, and the court there
had said, "Rent accrued to it [the lessee] as a stockholder of the cor-
19. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
20. By the time of the decision in United States v. Joliet & C.R.R., 315 U.S. 44 (1942),
regulations supporting the tax had long been operative, and the Court made use of that
fact. Id. at 47. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 80 (1914), was followed in Treas. Reg. 74, art. 70 (1928).
21. 2 Dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations 996-97 (4th ed. 1941).
22. Kansas City, St. L. & C.R.R. v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1942),
affirming 42 B.T.A. 1163 (1940); Gold & Stock Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F.2d 465
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 564 (1936), affirming 26 B.T.A. 914 (1932); Pacdflc &
Atl. Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F.2d 469 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 564 (1936),
affirming 26 B.T.A. 914 (1932); American Tel. & Cable Co., 17 B.T.A. 783 (1929); Ameri-
can Tel. & Cable Co., 2 B.T.A. 991 (1925).
23. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
292 U.S. 636 (1934).
24. Gold & Stock Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F.2d 465, 468 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
299 U.S. 564 (1936).
25. Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 20 F. Supp. 483 (WM). Ky. 1937),
appeal dismissed per curiam, 97 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1938).
26. 83 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 564 (1936).
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poration and, whether it chose to pay it to itself or not, its rights were
as truly worked out through the corporation as those of the other stoch-
holders.127
On the basis of whether a right to payment exists in form, Londsv!le,
H. & St. L. Ry. v. United States' s is consistent with the cases taxing
the lessor on payments which the lessee failed to make to itself. It does
seem curious that this difference in form should affect the substantive
result. There is, however, other authority consistent with this result.
The most similar case is Reynard Corp.- There the Board of Tax Ap-
peals held that, although a stockholder realized taxable income to the
extent of the rental value of a residence which belonged to the corpora-
tion and which he occupied without rent, the corporation did not realize
any income from the transaction. The same result appears to follow in
the case of bargain sales by corporations to their stockholders. The
bargain element may be a dividend to the stockholders,-" but the cor-
poration does not realize income through the distribution of a dividend
in kind, at least when it is not satisfying a dividend declared in terms
of a fixed sum of money."1
In 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc.,12 the Tax Court and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that a family corporation which sublet
property to a stockholder at a low rental was taxable on income realized
by the stockholder from operation of the property. The only advantage
in the sublease was the possibility of avoiding taxes, especially the excess
profits tax on the corporation. Both courts emphasized the lack of any
business purpose for the transaction.
Although there seems to be ample authority for use of the business
purpose doctrine in settling a question of allocation of incomer it is
difficult to accept here. We are not dealing with a statute which offers a
tax advantage only to business transactions, either expressly or by
implication. We are dealing simply with this question: whose in-
come was it? The substance over form doctrine does seem properly
applicable. If the sublease was flimsy in terms or was disregarded by
the parties, the court might say it was a sham and therefore to be dis-
27. Id. at 463.
2S. 20 F. Supp. 433 (W.). Ky. 1937), appeal dismisscd pcr curhim, 97 F2d 1017 (6th
Cir. 193S).
29. 30 B.T.A. 451 (1934).
30. Bittker, Federal Income Ta-mtion of Corporations and Stochholdcrz 135 (1959);
1 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 9.22 (Zimet, Stanley & KIlcullen rev. 195G6.
31. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 311(a)(2). See Bittker, Fcdcral Income Tamtign of
Corporations and Stockholders 153-54 (1959); 1 Mertens, Fedcral Income Tamtion
§§ 9.55, 9.58 (Zimet, Stanley & Kilcullen rev. 1956).
32. 16 T.C. 469 (1951), aft'd, 195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.), crt. dcnied, 344 U.S. 20 (1952).
33. See Holzman, Sound Business Purpose 96 (1953).
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regarded, and the lack of a business purpose might raise suspicion that
the lease was not real. Here, however, there was no express finding that
the sublease was a sham, but merely a quotation in the Second Circuit's
opinion listing a number of epithets, including that of "sham."0"
The situation is difficult. A court may justifiably suspect that, be-
cause of the relationship of the parties and the lack of a business purpose
for their transaction, they will disregard its form whenever that is ad-
vantageous. Yet the transaction may look normal in form and there may
be no evidence that the parties will not abide by it. If the court ignores
the form of the transaction, it is in effect saying that the Government may
disregard the form of any transaction entered by related parties without a
business purpose. It seems that this position involves a broad general
policy which should be adopted, if at all, by Congress and not by the
courts. Because the question is one of allocation of income and might
arise under varied types of facts, it may be more difficult to deal with
by statute than other questions. For example, it may have been much
easier to draft a statute denying a deduction for a loss incurred on a
transaction between related parties, but, if the present problem is
serious enough to demand action, perhaps a broadening of Section 482
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 would be satisfactory.
The fact that the 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc.,35 case is more recent
and of higher authority than the Louisville case may raise a question as
to whether any reliance can still be placed on the earlier case. It seems,
however, that the effect of the 58th St. Plaza Theatre case will probably
be narrow, in respect to realization of income by the lessor. Even if the
opinion is questionable, the atmosphere was bad for the taxpayer, be-
cause of the closely held character of the sublessor and the lack of busi-
ness advantage in the sublease. Also, the general principle, as discussed
above, is that a corporation does not realize income from the extension
of a bargain to its shareholders. Hence, it is submitted that the Louis-
ville case is reasonably reliable where there is a lease for a business
purpose, with the lessee being one of the unrelated stockholders of the
lessor.
It may be wise for the lessor and lessee to agree that the lessee shall
make no payments in respect to stock of the lessor owned by the lessee.
The difficulty is that even if the result of the Louisville case as to the
lessor's tax liability is accepted, awkward tax problems may arise in
respect to the lessee. There is authority for taxing a stockholder on the
bargain element in purchases 8 and leases87 from a corporation.
34. 195 F.2d at 725.
35. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
36. Timberlake v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 259 (4th Cir. 1942); V. U. Young, 5 T.C.
1251 (1945); Treas. Reg. § 1.301-1(j) (1955); Bittker, Federal Income Taxation of
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The theory on which a shareholder is taxed on the bargain element
in a lease is not so dear. As early as 1934, the Board of Tax Appeals took
the position, in Czarles A. Fz;,eazff," that the shareholder was either re-
ceiving compensation for services or "income received from any iource
whatever. ' ' 9^ Reference to the quoted language was necessary in the
Frzeazff case because the stockholder rendered no substantial services
to the corporation and the corporation apparently had no earnings.
Therefore, the case could hardly involve either compensation for services
or a dividend. In the Reyna;rd case, the stockholder rendered services
and was held to have received additional compensation to the extent of
the rental value of the residence he used. There the court argued that
taxability to the stockholder should not hinge on whether the corporation
had earnings.
It might be best to treat the question partly as one of fact, so that
the excess of rental value over rent paid will be compensation for services
to the extent that such excess, plus other compensation, is not unreason-
able for the services rendered. In other cases, the excess would be a
dividend, to the extent of available earnings and profits. This is con-
sistent with the present approach of the Internal Revenue Service.-
Earnings and profits seem to include only those available because of
other corporate transactions, since generally a corporate lessor does not
realize income on the making of a lease with a stockholder at a low
rental.
Payments to Creditors
Payments by a lessee to creditors of the lessor, such as tax collectors
or bondholders, have been taxed to the lessor. The principle is that
payinent to a creditor of a taxpayer in discharge of the taxpayer's obli-
gation is the same as payment to the taxpayer.'
Corporations and Shareholders 135 (1959). Under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 301, and
the related regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.01-1(a)-(l), the amount taxed to a corporate
stodholder is subject to special rules but the general principle rc.mains.
37. Reynard Corp., 30 B.TA. 451 (1934); Charles A. Frucaufi, 30 B.T.A. 449 (1934);
Re. Rul. 1, 195S-1 Cum. Bull. 173; Bittker, Federal Income Taxation of Corparationa
and Shareholders 136 (1959).
38. Supra note 37, at 450.
39. Ibid.
40. Rev. RuL 1, 195S-1 Cum. Bull. 173.
41. United States v. Northwestern Tel. Co., 10 F. Supp. 703, 710 (D. Conn. 1935),
rev1d on other grounds, 03 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299 US. 565 (1936). Thb
principle has been applied in other situations. E.g., Raybeztz-Manhaattan, Inc. v. United
States, 296 U.S. 60, 64 (1935); Douglas v. Willouts, 296 U.S. 1, 9 (1935); Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Broc"maan Bldg. Corp., Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 231 F.2d 145, 147 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 US. 936 (1955), atdrming 21
T.C. 175 (1953).
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So, payments by the lessee of interest to the lessor's bondholders are
taxable income to the lessor.42 Taxability to the lessor of such payments
has not been litigated very seriously, because the lessor can balance the
inclusion by a deduction for interest.43
The same result has been reached when the lessee has paid the prin-
cipal amount due on a debt of the lessor.44 The lessor has not been
relieved of tax liability by the fact that he was not personally liable for
the debt but merely holding property subject to it.40 The reason seems
to be that a person owning property by which a debt is secured must,
as a practical matter, treat the debt as his own, at least so long as the
property is worth more than the amount of the debt.40
Considerable litigation has arisen in cases in which the creditor of
the lessor, paid by the lessee, has been the federal government. A motive
to litigate has been supplied by the fact that the lessor cannot deduct
its own federal taxes, in contrast with payments of interest to its credi-
tors. It is now clear that the lessor realizes taxable income from the
lessee's payment of its federal income taxes.47 This result is based on
the long-standing regulations and practice of the Treasury Department,
as well as the authority of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner.48
Income is realized, not in the year for which the tax is assessed, 40 but
in the year in which the tax becomes due and is paidY
In resisting the asserted liability, taxpayers argued that their leases
would require the lessee to pay the lessor's tax on the amount of the
initial tax payment made by the lessee, that therefore calculation of
the lessor's total tax liability would require the use of algebraic formulae,
42. Northern R.R. v. Lowe, 250 Fed. 856 (2d Cir. 1918); Rensselaer & S.R.R. v. Irwin,
249 Fed. 726 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 671 (1918), affirming 239 Fed. 739 (N.D.N.Y.
1917); Blalock v. Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co., 246 Fed. 387 (5th Cir. 1917); United States
v. Northwestern Tel. Co., supra note 41.
43. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 163(a).
44. Brockman Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 936 (1955), affirming 21 T.C. 175 (1953); Ethel S. Amey, 22 T.C. 756 (1954); Wentz v.
Gentsch, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1128 (N.D. Ohio 1940) (memorandum decision).
45. Ethel S. Amey, supra note 44.
46. For this approach see Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). The matter has
been previously discussed by this writer. Rusoff, The Federal Income Tax Consequences of
Transactions Relating to Mortgages on Land, 4 Buffalo L. Rev. 198 (1954).
47. United States v. Joliet & C.R.R., 315 U.S. 44 (1942); United States v. Boston &
Me. R.R., 279 U.S. 732 (1929); Terre Haute Elec. Co., 33 B.T.A. 975 (1936), rev'd in part,
96 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1938); Mina. 6779, 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 8, supplemented by IR-Mm.
51, 1952-2 Cum. Bull. 65.
48. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
49. Norwich & W.R.R., 2 B.T.A. 215 (1925).
50. Chatham R.R., 9 B.T.A. 94 (1927); Boston & Me. R.R., 8 B.T.A. 490 (1927);
Ware River R.R., 7 B.T.A. 133 (1927); Providence & W.R.R., 5 B.T.A. 1186 (1927),
nonacq., VII-1 Cum. Bull. 39 (1928).
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and that "algebraic formulae are not lightly to be imputed to legisla-
tors." I' The courts rejected this argument. In the cases being con-
sidered, the Government had not asserted any claim to a tax except
upon the initial tax paid by the lessee., 2 The Government had not re-
quired the use of any algebraic formulae. 3 Furthermore, it was said
that, if the use of such formulae became necessary, it would be due to
the contract made by the lessor and lessee, not to the act of Congress.
Apparently, the Government continued its practice of claiming a tax
only upon the initial tax paid by the lessee until 1952.Y' Under that prac-
tice, no use of algebraic formulae was necessary. In 1952, however, the
Government ruled that the total of the income taxes of the lessor paid
by the lessee was taxable income of the lessor./0 Before the adoption of
provisions for declaration of estimated tax and current payment of in-
stallments of such tax, this ruling would not have required the use of
algebraic formulae. There would have been a pyramiding of the amount
of the tax paid by the lessee, if the lease required the lessee to pay all of
the income taxes of the lessor. The total would not, however, have been
all taxable income of the lessor for one year. The initial tax would
have been income for the year when it was due and payable; the tax
on the initial tax would have been due and payable in the following year
and therefore would have been income of the lessor for that later year.
Since the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, however, corpo-
rations whose tax for a year can reasonably be expected to exceed
$100,000 are required to file declarations of estimated tax in resp2ct to
such excess and to pay such estimated tax in installments during the
taxable year. For taxable years ending on or after December 31, 1959,
one-half of such estimated tax has to be paid currently.57 In the case
of a corporate lessor with enough income to be affected by these sec-
tions, computations beyond the scope of simple arithmetic would seem to
be necessary to determine the tax to be paid.
That the tax of corporate lessors with annual income tax liability of
over $100,000 would have to be computed by the use of higher mathe-
matics doesn't seem distressing, since such firms must normally have
their returns prepared by skilled accountants. A more serious objection
51. Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61, 63 (1924).
52. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 731 (1929); Pr ' dcnce
& W.R.R, 5 B.T.A. 11S6, 1190 (1927), nonacq., 'Ii-1 Cur. Bull. 39 (1920).
53. United States v. Boston & Me. R.R., 279 U.S. 732, 736 (1929).
54. Providence & W.R.R., 5 B.T.A. 11S6, 1190 (1927), nimnacq., VIII-1 Cum, Bull. 39
(1928).
55. Kades, Phantom Income: Net Leases and the Clark Case, 5 Syracuz L. Rcv. 1, 20
(1954).
56. Mlim. 6779, 1952-1 Cum. Bull. s, supplomentcd by IR-Mim. 51, 1952-2 Cum. Bull, L.
57. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6016, 6154.
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to the Government's ruling of 1952 is that it taxes the lessor beyond the
benefit it receives from the provision that the lessee shall pay the lessor's
income taxes. Such a provision does benefit the lessor, however, to the
extent of the initital tax, which the lessor would otherwise have had to
pay. Thus, it may be fair to treat that initial tax as taxable income of
the lessor and subject to an additional tax. Apart from such a provision,
however, the lessor would not have been liable for the additional tax,
so that it would be more reasonable not to treat that additional tax as
also being taxable income of the lessor.' 8
Construction of a lease to determine the extent of the lessee's duty
to pay the lessor's taxes has also given rise to problems. The question
of whether the lessee is obligated to pay income taxes of the lessor
depends on the intention of the parties and thus upon the rulings of
state courts in determining that intention." New York has held, for
example, that a provision that the lessee should pay all taxes levied
on the leased property or on the lessor "by reason of its ownership
thereof" did not impose liability to pay the income taxes of the lessor.0 0
If the parties misjudge the liability of the lessee and it pays taxes of
the lessor when there is no obligation to do so, those taxes are includible
in the gross income of the lessor, under the doctrine of taxing amounts
received under a claim of right."'
The 1954 Code provides limited relief when a lessee pays his lessor's
income taxes. Section 110 provides that if a corporate lessee pays the
federal income tax of a corporate lessor on the rentals, the payment is
not includible in the gross income of the lessor.02 This section applies
only if the lease was entered into before January 1, 1954, or was renewed
or continued after that date pursuant to an option contained in a lease
before that date. If the section applies, the lessee may not deduct any
payments.
The motive for the adoption of section 110 was seemingly a desire
to avoid unexpected hardship on the lessee. The Senate committee report
stated that the lessee is required to pay not only the original tax of the
lessor but also the tax on the first tax and so on in pyramidical fashion,
with the result that the lessee sometimes pays more in taxes than its
taxable income and thus realizes no tax benefit from its deduction for
rent paid or accrued.63
58. Kades, Phantom Income: Net Leases and the Clark Case, 5 Syracuse L. Rev. 18,
26-27 (1954).
59. Mim. 6779, 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 8.
60. Brainard v. New York Cent. R.R., 242 N.Y. 125, 131, 151 N.E. 152, 153 (1926).
61. United States v. Mahoning Coal R.R., 51 F.2d 208 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U.S.
559 (1931).
62. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 110.
63. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1954).
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II. COLLECTION OF T.),,ms ASSESSED AGAINST 'IHE LrssoR BECAUSE
OF PAYMENTS BY TM LESSEE TO OTHrRS
The Government's success in treating payments made to others by a
lessee as income to the lessor would be empty if it could not collect taxes
on such payments. Under the typical long-term lease raising this prob-
lem, the lessor has controlled no assets which it could use to pay the
taxes. Presumably, its reversion is worthless.'- Thus, sale of the re-
version would produce little or nothing for the Government. The prob-
lem, then, has been to reach the payments made by the lessee, in the
hands of either the lessee or the recipients.
It appears that the Government first tried suing the lessee to impress
a lien on amounts which the lessee was obligated to pay to the stock-
holders of the lessor. This effort failed. In 1931, the Second Circuit held
that such an action could not be maintainedP The court reasoned that
the statute providing a lien for ta-es93 did not apply to a debt and that
the Government's rights against the lessee were not greater than those
of the lessor, it being unable to prevent the lessee from making payments
directly to the stockholders of the lessor. The court also said that the
provision rendering a fiduciary liable for debts due the United States
from the person for whom he acts, if he pays any other debts before
those due to the United States, creates no lien and does not apply to
one who is a debtor rather than a fiduciary.
The next round of the struggle involved an attempt to assert trans-
feree liability against the lessor's stockholders under what is now sec-
tion 6901(a)(1)(A)(i) Y9  In 1933, the Second Circuit decided this
matter against the Government.c9 The rationale of its decision was as
follows: (1) The liability of a shareholder as a transferee is a matter
of local law, since the statute purports only to provide a method of en-
forcing a liability existing under local law rather than to create a new
liability. (2) Under local law, liability hinges on the existence of a
transfer by one who is insolvent. (3) Here the transfer to the stock-
holders occurred in 1890, when the lease was made, either through an
assignment of future rents or through the making of a third-party bene-
ficiary contract. (4) There was no evidence that the lessor was insol-
64. Ham. ood v. Eaton, 6S F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1933), affirming 59 F-d 1CG) (D. Conn.
1932), cert. denied, 292 US. 636 (1934).
65. United States v. Western Union Tel. Co., 50 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1931).
66. Rev. Stat. § 31S6 (1S75).
67. Rev. Stat. § 3467 (IS75), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 192 (195S).
6S. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6901(a)(1)(A)(i).
69. Harocd v. Eaton, 59 F2d 1009 (D. Conn. 1932), aff'd, 63 F2d 12 &Zd Cir 1933),
cerL denied, 292 U.S. 636 (1934).
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vent in 1890 and it had no liability in 1890 for the taxes involved in
this litigation.71
The turning point in the Government's struggle to collect the lessor's
income taxes on payments made by the lessee to the shareholders of
the lessor was United States v. Joliet & C.R.R., 71 which held a corpo-
rate lessor taxable on amounts paid by the lessee to both the Govern-
ment and the stockholders. In United States v. Morris & E.R.R.72 and
United States v. Warren R.R.73 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit interpreted this decision as based on the notion that the corpo-
rate lessor constructively receives the payments made by the lessee to
the stockholders and, in effect, then transfers them to the stockholders
as current annual dividends. The stockholders were considered to have
derived their rights from their status as stockholders.
The Second Circuit further held in the Morris and Warren cases that
there were two remedies available to the Government. It held that the
lessee can be enjoined from making payments to the stockholders of the
lessor until the United States has had an opportunity to levy thereon to
satisfy the income tax liability of the lessor. It also held that the lessee
can be ordered to pay to the District Director of Internal Revenue the
amount levied on from time to time, which may be necessary to satisfy
the liability of the lessor.7 4 Since the Second Circuit now took the posi-
tion that the lessor constructively received the annual payments from the
lessee and transferred them to its stockholders, it also treated each pay-
ment as a fraudulent conveyance which could be set aside in equity.
Consequently, the lessor's stockholders could be reached as transferees,
even under the earlier decisions that the liability of a transferee depends
on state law.75 The remedy of injunction and collection from the lessee
70. In this and the succeeding cases in the Second Circuit involving the problem of
collecting the tax, Judge Learned Hand maintained that the corporate lessor and Its
stockholders are not distinct for the purposes of the current litigation, while his colleagues
took the contrary view. Nevertheless, they agreed in the result.
71. 315 U.S. 44 (1942).
72. 135 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 754 (1943).
73. 127 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1942).
74. In Warren, the court said that there can be a lien on a debt. Id. at 137-38.
75. This result apparently will not be upset by the recent decisions on the liability of a
beneficiary of an insurance policy for income taxes of the insured, as a transferee. United
States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958); Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958). Those
cases seem to hinge on variable local rules as to the rights of creditors of an insured to
proceeds of his insurance and on facts showing whether the Government has established
a lien during the lifetime of the decedent. Here, however, the lessor's stockholders are
treated as transferees each year, as a matter of federal law. 9 Mertens, Federal Income
Taxation § 53.41 n.32 (Zimet rev. 1958). The lessor has no assets, except the reversion,
so that each payment to its stockholders would be a fraudulent transfer under principles
generally accepted by state courts as to creditors' rights.
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appears to be more fair, since in an action against a stockholder as a
transferee the whole tax may be collected from less than all of the
stockholders. Because of the possible hardship in an action against a
transferee, a state court of New York also has held that the lessee may
be ordered to pay the tax liability of the lessor before making any dis-
tribution to the stockholders of the lessor.
Under the 1954 Code, another procedure may be available to the
Government. It has been suggested that the phrase "or obligated with
respect to" in section 6332(a) 77 imposes on a debtor the duty to pay
the debt to the District Director on demand, without distraint and sale
of the debt or an action to enforce a lien against the debt."'
III. NITHETHER PAYMENTS BY A STOCKHOLDER ARE RENT OR
CONTRMUTIONS TO CAPITAL
When a stockholder uses corporate property and makes payments to
the corporation, a question may arise as to whether the payments are
rent or contributions to capital. Rent, of course, may be deductible by
the stockholder and is includible in gross income by the corporation;
contributions to capital are not deductible by the stockholder or tax-
able to the corporation.
There are different situations in which this problem can arise. If a
lessee-stockholder pays an excessive rent to his corporation, the excess
over a reasonable rent should be treated as a contribution to capital.
The statute does not ex-pressly limit the deduction for rent to a reason-
able amount, but it permits the deduction only of "payments required to
be made."17  The excess over a reasonable rental may be treated as not
"required" and as amounting to something other than rent. 9
This question may also arise if stockholders use property of a corpora-
tion and make payments to the corporation which the corporation uses
to retire its debt or preferred stock held by others. Such use of the
payments increases the value of the interests of the stockholders in the
corporation, which gives rise to an initial reaction that the payments
should be treated as contributions to capital. That result, however, does
not necessarily follow. Generally, the character of a payment is not
determined by the use to which it is put by the payee. It is easy to
76. Northwestern Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 197 Mic. 1075, 99 N.Y.S2d 331
(Sup. Ct. 190).
77. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6332(a).
73. 3 Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income, Gift and Estate Ta.ation § 73.02(6) (1956).
79. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a)(3).
00. Roland P. Place, 17 T.C. 199 (1951), aff'd per curian, 199 F-2d 373 (6th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953). See Stanley Imerman, 7 T.C. 1030, 1037 (1946), acq.,
1947-1 Cum. Bull. 2; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a)(3).
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conceive a case in which a stockholder makes a payment which is clearly
an income item to the corporation, such as rent, payment for services
rendered or the purchase price of goods sold. In such a case, it would
make no difference that the corporation in fact used the payment to
reduce its debts or to retire stock held by others. The opposite is also
true, i.e., a payment by a stockholder may be a contribution to capital,
although it is used to meet an operating expense of the corporation."
Suppose the stockholder makes the payment pursuant to an agreement
that the corporation will use the payment to retire its debt or stock held
by others. Does the factor of prearrangement give more weight to the
character of the use? In Paducah & Ill. R.R.,82 the Board of Tax
Appeals treated such prearrangement as decisive and held that the pay-
ments so used were contributions to capital, not income to the corpora-
tion. In later cases involving such a factor, the Board reached a con-
trary conclusion.
3
So, the factor of prearranged use has not been treated as conclusive.
What weight should it have? The answer to this question should be
attempted in the light of another: What is the basic test of whether a
payment is rent or a contribution to capital? Probably an appellate court
would say that it is the intention of the parties. Such a test is said to
govern in distinguishing a loan from a contribution to capital.84 Ascer-
taining the intent of the parties may be difficult, and a trial court may
have to decide, not what they actually intended, but what reasonable and
realistic persons in the same situation should have thought they were
doing, had they considered the matter. The finding of fact and opinion
of the trial court may be worded in terms of actual intent, but it is likely
to be an intent constructed by the trial court on the basis of the actions
of the parties, the objective manifestations of their intent. Thus, the
court is not actually ascertaining intent but determining what the parties
"really" did."8
On the basis of this test of constructive intent, what is the significance
of a prearranged agreement that the corporation is to retire its debt or
preferred stock? If the stockholder has paid a reasonable rent for his
use of the corporate facilities, any additional amount he pays to be used
to retire corporate debt or stock held by others should probably be
81. See Rittenberg v. United States, 267 F.2d 605 (th Cir, 1959), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 931 (1960).
82. 2 B.T.A. 1001, 1007 (1925), acq., V-1 Cum. Bull. 4 (1926).
83. Terminal Realty Corp., 32 B.T.A. 623, nonacq., XIV-2 Cum. Bull. 43 (1935);
Nowland Realty Co., 18 B.TA. 405 (1929), aff'd, 47 F.2d 1018 (7th Cir. 1931).
84. 2 Rabkin & Johnson, Federal Income, Estate and Gift Taxation § 35.08(1) (1954).
85. An example of the process to which the writer refers may be found In the dis-
cussion of Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952), Infra at 233.
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treated as a contribution to capital. This factor, therefore, at most
reinforces the conclusion that would usually be reached when a stock-
holder pays an excessive rent to his corporation. If the stockholder is
not paying more than a reasonable rent for the use of the corporate
property, the entire amount should be treated as rent, regardless of
the corporation's use of the payment.
In the above discussion, the stockholder's use of corporate proporty
is given more weight than the corporation's use of the stockholder's
payment. Why? It is normal business practice to pay rent for the use
of property and to make capital contributions via the purchase of stock,
whereas making a capital contribution in the form of a payment for the
use of corporate property is abnormal. The normality or abnormality of
a practice should be weighty when we are constructing an intent for the
parties.
Another factor to be considered is whether the stockholder was given
any additional corporate stock in return for his payments. Where he
was, the Board has treated his payment as a contribution to capital.,
Where he was not, the Board has treated the payment as rent, with
emphasis on this factor as a ground of distinction.67 The issue of addi-
tional stock should be substantial evidence that the parties' actual intent
was to make a contribution to capital; the lack of such an issue, how-
ever, may be neutral as to actual intent and therefore should not pre-
clude a finding that a contribution to capital was made, at least if the
payment to the corporation exceeded a reasonable rental for the prop-
erty used. The regulations indicate that there can be a contribution to
capital without an issue of additional stock2 s
The Board has emphasized the parties' description of payments as
rent.60 Their words are, of course, evidence of what they say their
intention is, but they do not prove conclusively their actual intention.
In the cases cited,"° the words used by the parties were relied on in im-
posing a burden on the taxpayer. This is consistent with the approach
of Higgins v. Smitz, 1 where the Supreme Court indicated that the form
adopted by a taxpayer may bind him more tightly than the Government.
There, however, the Court was dealing with the form of business organi-
zation, not the mere use of a name for a payment. Also, there have been
86. Paducah ' Il. R.R., 2 B.T.A. 1001 (1925), acq., V-I Cum. Bull. 4 (1926).
87. Terminal Realty Corp., 32 B.T.A. 623, 632, nonacq., XIV-2 Cum. Bull. 43 (1935).
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(a) (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.113-1 (1966).
39. Terminal Realty Corp., 32 B.T.A. 623, 632, nonacq., XIV-2 Cum. Bull. 43 (1935);
Nowland Realty Co., 1S B.T.A. 405, 413 (1929), aff'd, 47 F-2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1931).
90. See note 89 supra and accompanying test.
91. 303 U.S. 473, 477 (1940).
1960]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
cases in which the label used by a taxpayer has been disregarded to his
tax advantage. 2 Thus, it seems that this is a minor factor.
A more significant factor should be whether the payments are ap-
portioned to the stockholder's use of the corporate facilities or to its
ownership of stock. Oddly, however, in the two cases in which this factor
might be found, the one in which payments were apportioned to use held
that they were contributions to capital,93 and the one in which they were
apportioned to stockholders treated them as rental income.94 These re-
sults seem directly contrary to the natural inference of intent. The
conclusion seems to be that the Board has attached less importance to
the apportionment of payments than to the issue of additional stock
and the parties' choice of language. This may have been proper when
the payments were apportioned to use and additional stock was issued,
as in Paducak & Ill. R.R.0  but it seems to have been wrong when the
payments were apportioned to stockholdings and no additional stock
was issued, as in Terminal Realty Corp.,)" since the lack of an issue of
additional stock seems to be at most a weak factor.07
The cases dealing with the problem of whether a payment is rent or
a contribution to capital do not seem, then, to make a rational pattern.
The difficulty may arise from the fact that few cases have dealt with
the problem, and this in turn may result from the double-edged nature
of the situation. A tax advantage to the taxpayer or the commissioner
is usually balanced by a tax disadvantage on the same side, so that the
incentive to raise or litigate an issue in this area is relatively slight.
IV. WHETHER PAYMENTS BY A CoRPoRATIoN ARE RENT OR DIVIDENDS
The problem here arises from a situation which is the reverse of that
discussed in the preceding section. A stockholder leases property to a
corporation. The question is whether "rent" paid by the corporation is
excessive and, in substance, partly a dividend, not deductible by the
corporation. The courts have said that an excessive payment is neither
92. Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939). In fact, in the first case
dealing with the problem before us, the Board of Tax Appeals held that a payment re-
ceived by the taxpayer was partly a contribution to capital, not includible in gross income,
although it appeared that the amount in question, used for a sinking fund, might come
from sums referred to as "rentals." Paducah & Ill. R.R., 2 B.T.A. 1001, 1004-05 (1923), acq.,
V-1 Cum. Bull. 4 (1926). The reference was not prominent, and the Board, in later
distinguishing this case, said that the payments had not been called rental. Terminal Realty
Corp., 32 B.T.A. 623, 632, nonacq., XIV-2 Cum. Bull. 43 (193S).
93. Paducah & Ill. R.R., supra note 92.
94. Terminal Realty Corp., 32 B.T.A. 623 (1935), nonacq., XIV-2 Cum. Bull. 43 (1935).
95. 2 B.T.A. 1001 (1925), acq., V-1 Cum. Bull. 4 (1926).
96. 32 B.T.A. 623 (1935), nonacq., XIV-2 Cum. Bull. 43 (1935).
97. For a discussion of this point see notes 86-83 supra and accompanying text.
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an ordinary and necessary business expense nor an amount required to
be paid as a condition to the continued use of the propertys Con-
sequently the principal question is one of fact as to whether the pay-
ment was excessive.Y0 In some cases, the lessor is not a stocholder but
a friend or member of his family. A purpose of avoiding taxes is gener-
ally apparent in such cases, and the courts emphasize it in their
opinions.300
Here the business purpose doctrine seems appropriate, since the con-
cepts used in section 162(a)( 3 )1"1 call for consideration of the tax-
payer's motive. For example, a question arises as to whether an exces-
sive expenditure made to avoid taxes is "ordinary" in the sense of being
common among businessmen. If it is, it does not appear to be "neces-
sary" or helpful to the business. Nor would it be "required," since the
payer presumably could obtain the use of other facilities for a reasonable
rent: the amount that would have to be paid for similar facilities in an
arm's length transaction is strong evidence of whether a given rent is
reasonable. Furthermore, the concepts "ordinary," "necessary" and
"required" have an indefinite quality which facilitates giving weight to
tax avoidance motives.
V. WHETHER A TRANSACTION IS A LEASE WITH OPTION TO
Buy OR A SALE
M1any cases deal with the question of whether a transaction con-
stituted a lease with an option to buy or a sale.1'" This question involves
two tax problems. Has a taxpayer paid rentals, which he can deduct
currently, or the purchase price of property, which he can deduct, if
at all, through depreciation? Has a taxpayer received rentals, which
are taxable as ordinary income, or proceeds from the sale of property,
93. Limerick's, Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 114S); Starnv.ic'!, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 15 T.C. 5-6 (1950), affd pcr curiam, 190 F.2d 2 (4th Cir. 1951). S,2
Int. Re,. Code of 1954, § 162(a).
99. Ibid. See 0. Bee, Inc., 13 CCH Tax CL Alem. 695 (1959); Floridan Hotcl Op r-
ators, Inc-, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 136 (1953); Iron City Indw-trial Ckanin7 Corp.,
6 CCH Tax Ct. 21em. 1237 (1947).
1O. Stanich's, Inc., 15 T.C. 556 (1950), affd per curiam, I0 F.2d Z4 (4th Cir. 1951);
Floridan Hotel Operators, Inc., supra note 99.
101. ut Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a) (3).
102. Some of these cases are concerned with personal pro:prty. Generally, there L no
important distinction here between real and personal propzrty. Fricdman, Lxase or Pr-
chase of Equipment: Sale and Leaseback, N.Y.U. 14th Inst. on Ft.L Tax 1427,
1423 (SeUin ed. 1956); Johnson, Le see Improvements to Leac.d Prop.rty and Options
to Purchase, N.Y.U. 12th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 75, Q) tSdllin cd. 1954). Hower, there
may be a difference. Because personal property, unlike land, uually has a limitcd u:Sful
life, a purported lease of personalty may be treated as a Fale if the term of the Ica-e
equals the useful life of the property. Rev. Rul. 60-122, 1960 Int. Rev. Bull. No, 14, at 9.
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which may be taxed only to the extent of his gain and perhaps only at
capital gains rates?
Section 162(a) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code deals with the above
question. It provides: "(a) In general.-There shall be allowed as a
deduction... (3) rentals.., of property to which the taxpayer has not
taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity." This language
relates only to the deductions of the payer. The problem as to the
payee's income is whether it is rental income, taxed at ordinary rates
under section 61(a) (5),103 or gain from the sale of property, subject to
sections 61(a)(2) or (3)104 as well as section 1001,1°r and perhaps
section 1201106 and sections dealing with capital gains. Only section
162(a) (3) contains any express language helpful in distinguishing rental
income from gain from the sale of property. Consequently, the cases
rely on the issues raised under section 162 (a) (3), whether the taxpayer
is the payer or the payee, and they cite cases dealing with either party
interchangeably. 107
The question that arises generally is whether a transaction which is in
the form of a lease with an option to buy is in substance a sale. As
usual, the cases indicate that substance governs rather than form, if
they are not the same. 08 One difficulty is that the form may receive
some weight in the determination of the substance, but the courts have
not agreed as to the amount of that weight.' The Tax Court has said
that the words used by the party have some significance but are not
controlling.'" The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has stated
that the fact the parties used the form and terminology of a lease is of no
103. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a)(5).
104. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 61(a)(2)-(3).
105. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1001.
106. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1201.
107. Formerly, the Commissioner and the Tax Court did not feel required to treat
"lessors" and "lessees" consistently. Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25, 32 (1948), acq., 1949-1
Cum. Bull. 2; Friedman, Lease or Purchase of Equipment: Sale and Leaseback, N.Y.U.
14th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1427, 1444 (Sellin ed. 1956); Johnson, Lessee Improvements
to Leased Property and Options to Purchase, N.Y.U. 12th Inst. on Fed. Tax 75, 91
(Seflin ed. 1954); Rosenfeld, Leases With Options to Purchase, U. So. Cal. 12th Tax
Inst. 655, 656 (Ervin ed. 1960).
108. Abramson v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Iowa 1955), has been cited as
holding that the form of a lease governs. Friedman, Lease or Purchase of Equipment: Sale
and Leaseback, N.Y.U. 14th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1427, 1442 (Selln ed. 1956). It is
submitted, however, that Abramson, supra, merely held that nothing in the evidence showed
that the substance of the transaction varied from its form.
109. Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation 89 n.307 (1st Series 1937).
110. Walburga Oesterreich, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 277, 279 (1953), rev1d, 226 F.2d
798 (9th Cir. 1955); Jefferson Gas Coal Co., 16 B.T.A. 1135, 1139, nonacq., VIII-2 Cum.
Bull. 65 (1929), aff'd, 52 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1931).
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consequence.'-" The position of the Tax Court seems more sound.
Since the courts always describe the form of the transaction in their
findings of fact, they must be taking such into account in determining the
intent of the parties. Probably, however, they give it little weight if the
other facts belie it.
In this area, it seems proper to suspect that the substance of a trans-
action may be different from its form, and therefore little weight should
be given to the form if such suspicion is right. A lease with an option
to buy has tax advantages for the buyer not present in an ordinary
purchase, so that the buyer has a strong incentive to cast a purchase in
the form of a lease even though he expects to buy. 12 For the seller, a
lease with an option to buy may not be as desirable for tax purposes as a
sale."' Yet it seems that sellers frequently are willing to disguise a sale
as a lease with an option to buy, in order to enable buyers to seek their
own tax advantages. Cases exist in which there was no reasonable
probability that the lessee-buyer would not exercise his option. With an
option to buy, the parties are not accepting any of the disadvantages
which go with a real lease. In such cases, it is submitted that the court
should be free to apply the substance over form doctrine and treat the
transaction as a sale.
Assuming that substance governs, what criteria determine the sub-
stance? Although the Tax Court at first said that the intention of the
parties is decisive,' it later said it did not matter."' The Tax Court
developed an "economic test," which has been stated as follows:
Cases like this, where payments at the time they are made have dual potenthilitics,
i.e., they may turn out to be payments of purchase price or rent for the use of
property, have always been difficult to catalogue for income tax purpioZ-. A fixed
rule for guidance of taxpayers and the Commissioner is highly desirable, and it is
also desirable that the rule, whatever it is, be as fair as possble, both to the tax-
Ill. Haggard v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 203, 2S9 (9th Cir. 1916).
112. The buyer will want the price divided into high rcntal payments and a low option
price. If the form of the transaction is not attacked succ.cszfully, he will be able to deduct
the rentals currently and from ordinary income. In rcturn for this prcent adantage,
he will have to accept later disadvantages, such as lower dcductions for depredaion, ba-cd
on the low option price, and a larger gain on resale. The sting of theze dLadvantayz may
not be great, for they are delayed. The property may only have bczn partly deprcciable,
however, or not at all, and the gain on rezale may be capital.
113. Rent is ordinary income to him, whereas gain on an outright fale might L2 capital.
On the other hand, until the option is eaercked, a lcsor-sellr may deduct dcprciation, if
the property is depreciable in his hands, and, if he is a dcaler, his gain on a calc would be
ordinary income. If the option price is low in relation to the eer's bani, he may have an
ordinary loss on the sale, even though his gain, if any, mi.ght have bcn capital under Int
Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231.
114. E. G. Robertson, 19 B.T.A. 534, 533 (1930), nonacq., X-I Cum. Bull. 91 (1931).
115. Judson :Mills, 11 T.C. 25, 32 (1943), acq., 1949-1 Cum. Bull 2.
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payer and the tax collector. If payments are large enough to exceed the depreciation
and value of the property and thus give the payor an equity in the property, it is
less of a distortion of income to regard the payments as purchase price and allow
depreciation on the property than to offset the entire payment against the income of
one year."16
The notion that the payer is obtaining an equity in the property and
hence may not deduct his payments, if they exceed "depreciation and
value of the property," has been frequently used by the Tax Court.
The quoted phrase has never been explained by the Tax Court, and its
meaning is hopelessly obscure.
The phrase "depreciation and value" has been given four interpreta-
tions: (1) Depreciation in value;"" (2) depreciation and rental
value;" 8 (3) original value less depreciation;" 9 and (4) depreciation
and remaining property value. 20 The mere existence of these various
interpretations casts doubt on the value of the phrase, and reflection
increases that doubt.
The weakness of the first and second interpretations appears if we
consider that under a clearly genuine lease the lessor should receive
rent exceeding his depreciation. Although one who already owns prop-
erty may have to accept rent which is less than depreciation, a business-
man making a new investment in rental property would be foolish to buy
property with a rental value less than its depreciation. Therefore, the
first interpretation falls. The second seems irrelevant, since depreciation
should be included within rental value; there seems to be no purpose
in thinking of depreciation as something to be added to rental value.' 2 '
To test the third interpretation, figures are necessary. If a $20,000
house with a fifty-year estimated useful life were built on a $2,000 lot,
the depreciated value of the property at the end of twenty years, on a
straight-line basis, would be $14,000. If the house were rented for $125 a
month, the total rent over twenty years would be $30,000, which is sub-
stantially greater than the original value less depreciation. It is clear that
the rent would have to be $220 a month to make the property attractive
as a new, voluntary investment. In twenty years, such rent would total
116. Chicago Stoker Corp., 14 T.C. 441, 444-45 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
117. Mary A. Browning, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1061, 1067 (1950); Renner & Maras,
Inc., 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 451, 454 (1950); Schiller & Holtzman, Some Tax Aspects of
Leaseholds, 11 Miami L. Q. 273, 274 (1956).
118. Rosenfeld, Leases With Options to Purchase, U. So. Cal. 12th Tax Inst. 655,
658 (Ervin ed. 1960); 53 Colum. L. Rev. 277, 278 (1953).
119. Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 1955).
120. Greenfield, Corporate Benefits in Using the Sale-Leaseback Device, 37 Taxes 1017,
1022 (1959).
121. For a consideration of whether rental value may be used in some other way In
distinguishing between leases and sales, see note 124 infra and accompanying text.
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$52,800. For twenty years' rent to total just $14,000, the monthly rent
would be $58.33. It is arguable that the figures based on a monthly rent
of $125 or more do not show the weakness of the third interpretation, on
the ground that most tenants of homes would not sign a twenty-year lease
at such rent. It is submitted, however, that many tenants would eagerly
sign a twenty-year lease for the hypothetical house at a rent of more
than $58.33 a month. Thus, it seems clear that the third interpretation
is unsound.
The fourth interpretation is more plausible. Assuming that there is
no change in market values, depreciation and remaining property
value would be the same as the original cost, $22,000. MIonthly rent of
$125 for twenty years would total $30,000, but it is arguable that the
average tenant of a home does not sign a long-term lease and would not
sign a twenty-year lease for such rent. The rent would have to exceed
$91.67 a month to total more, in twenty years, than $22,000. A question
arises as to whether a tenant would sign a twenty-year lease at a higher
rental. Perhaps he wouldn't, but several factors should be remembered.
The concern here has been with a return to the landlord which would not
induce a person to invest in rental realty. At a more adequate return of
one per cent a month, or $220, the total rent for twenty years would
be $52,800, an amount far exceeding the original cost. Why would
a tenant agree to pay more in rent than the sum for which he could
purchase the property? He might do so to make his financial statements
look more favorable than if he had purchased subject to a mortgage, 1
to keep the assets that would be necessary for a down payment on a
purchase available for another use, to obtain the use of a particular site
which is not for sale, or to avoid the problems, risks and expenses
inherent in ownership. Also, he may lack cash for a down payment.
Therefore, it seems at least doubtful that there is any help in the phrase
"depreciation and value" even under the fourth interpretation.
If that phrase is not helpful in applying the economic test, what factors
should govern under such a test? It is submitted that the decisive factor
is the relationship between the option price and the fair market value of
the property as of the time for exercise of the option. A court probably
would respect the amount at which the parties might reasonably have
estimated such value when they made their agreement.1" If the option
price is unreasonably below the value of the property, as so estimated,
122. This factor may be of less significance than before, as it appears that accountants
are tending to insert in a balance sheet a footnote showing liability under a 1=2. Com-
ment, 66 Yale LJ. 751, 760 (1957).
123. Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F-2d 319, 322 (7th Cir. 1956);
Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745, 752 (Sth Cir. 1952). Cf. Franhlin Lcon Alhnmder,
17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 221, 227-23 (19-S).
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it seems obvious that the parties expected the "lessee" to exercise it and
that the transaction should be treated as a sale.
Payment of rent in excess of rental value has been emphasized.12'
This appears secondary to the relationship between the option price and
the value of the property, for, if the option price is high, the fact that
the rent also is high creates no certainty that the "lessee" really intends
to buy. A high rent may, however, warn that the option price is probably
below the value of the property; typically, when a sale is disguised as a
lease with an option to buy, the rent is high and the option price is
low.12 The "lessee" does not want to pay an amount exceeding the
value of the property, and the "lessor" does not want to accept less.
Thus, when there is evidence that the rent is abnormally high, the court
should test whether the option price is correspondingly low.
Other economic factors which tend to show that a transaction is a
sale rather than a lease are inclusion of interest on the unpaid balance in
the "rentals,"'2 inclusion of interest in the option price, 27 credit of
rentals against the purchase price, 28 passage of title, without further
payment, on the payment of certain rentals, 29 payment of insurance
premiums by the "lessee,"'' 0 and deduction of depreciation by the
",lessee."' 31'
124. D. M. Haggard, 24 T.C. 1124, 1128, 1130 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 241 F.2d 288
(9th Cir. 1956); Franklin Leon Alexander, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mere. 221, 227 (1958);
Rev. Rul. 542, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 59, 60; Rev. Rul. 540, 1955-2 Cune. Bull. 39, 42.
125. In the absence of evidence of rental value, the same danger signal appears If rent
for a short term is high in relation to the fair market value of the property. Truman
Bowen, 12 T.C. 446, 463 (1949), acq., 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 1; Rev. Rul. 540, 1955-2 Cum.
Bull. 39, 41.
126. Estate of Delano T. Starr, 30 T.C. 856 (1958), rev'd, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959);
Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 2; Robert A. Taft, 27 B.T.A.
808 (1933); Rev. Rul. 542, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 59; Rev. Rul. 540, 1955-2 Cune. Bull. 39.
127. Truman Bowen, 12 T.C. 446 (1949), acq., 1951-2 Cum. Bull. 1. But cf. Estate of
Clarence B. Eaton, 10 T.C. 869 (1948), acq., 1948-2 Cum. Bull. 2.
128. Joe W. Scales, 18 T.C. 1263 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 211 F.2d 133 (6th
Cir. 1954); Truman Bowen, supra note 127; Helser Mach. & Marine Works, Inc., 39
B.T.A. 644 (1939); E. G. Robertson, 19 B.T.A. 534 (1930), nonacq., X-1 Cum. Bull. 91
(1931); Western Contracting Corp., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 371 (1958), rev'd, 271 F.2d
694 (8th Cir. 1959); W. H. Hughes, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 797 (1952); William A.
McWaters, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 507 (1950); Rev. Rul. 540, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 39.
129. Helser Mach. & Marine Works, Inc., supra note 128; Rev. Rul. 540, 1955-2 Cum.
Bull. 39. See Truman Bowen, supra note 127. Contra, Estate of Clarence B. Eaton, 10
T.C. 869 (1948), acq., 1948-2 Cum. Bull. 2.
130. Lemon v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Va. 1953); Breece Veneer &
Panel Co., 22 T.C. 1386 (1954), rev'd, 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956); Robert A. Taft, 27
B.T.A. 808 (1933); Lee Johns, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 603 (1956).
131. East Coast Equip. Co., 21 T.C. 112 (1953), acq., 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 4, afO'd, 222
F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1955).
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The economic test developed by the Tax Court was rejected by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Bcnton v. Coxwssioncr.'
There the court stated that, instead, a "legal" test, based on the intention
of the parties, should be used. The Tax Court, in addition to discussing
the economic factors, had stated that the parties intended to effect a sale,
but it made this statement only in its opinion, without finding such intent
as a fact.i 3a
The principle of the Benton decision seems undesirable. Determining
actual intent is difficult, and requiring trial courts to do it is generally
thought to cause confusion and increased litigation. Because of the
opportunity for tax avoidance in this area, the form of instruments and
the statements of the parties are poor evidence of actual intention. This
is a business transaction, and therefore the economic factors are likely
to be the most reliable guide to the intention of the parties. If intention is
found from such factors, any such finding is likely to be a formality and
the Benton rule will not have much effect on the decisions.
The reversal of the Tax Court's decision in the Benton case seems to
have had largely a formal effect on its later decisions. It has denied
deductibility to purported payments of rent in seven cases.Y It has
decided four cases in favor of the deduction,""3 but only one was a good
case for the Government.'-" Before the Benton decision, the Tax Court
did not make express findings of fact as to the parties' intention. Now
it tends to do so.' 37 It seems, however, that the finding is a formality,
the basis of which is the economic factors. The following language from
a Tax Court opinion should be noted:
132. 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952), reversing 9 CCH Tx Ct. Mcm. 811 (1950).
133. Even with reference to the economic test, Benton, supra nte 132, was net a vry
good case for the Government, because the option price, although eiow the value of the
property when the agreement was made, was not nominal. Furthcr, a drop in value might
reasonably have been expected.
134. Estate of Delano T. Starr, 30 T.C. 356 (195S), rev'd, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959);
Quartzite Stone Co., 30 T.C. 511 (195S), nonacq., 1959-1 Cum. Bull. 6, aff'd, 273 F.2d 733
(loth Cir. 1959); Ersel H. Beus, 2S T.C. 1133 (1957), afi'd, 261 FM 176 (9th Cir. 1953);
D. M.. Haggard, 24 T.C. 1124 (1955), aff'd per curiam, 241 F.d 2OS (9h Cir. 19376);
Breece Veneer & Panel Co., 22 T.C. 1326 (1954), rev'd, 232 F2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956);
Western Contracting Corp., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 371 (19,0), rev'd, 271 F.d 694 (,'th
Cir. 1959) ; Edwin Al. Clark, Jr., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mlem. 39 (1953).
135. WTBSR, Inc., 30 T.C. 747 (1953), acq., 1953-2 Cum. Bull. 3; Fkhing Tackle Prod.
Co., 27 T.C. 63S (1957); Walburga Oesterreich, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Micm. 277 (1953), rcv'd,
226 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1955); Calcasieu Paper Co., Inc., 12 CCH Tax Ct. Micm. 74 (1953).
136. Walburga Oasterreich, supra note 135.
137. D. B1. Haggard, 24 T.C. 1124, 1127 (1955), aftd pcr curian, 241 F2d 23 (9th
Cir. 1956); Breece Veneer & Panel Co., 22 T.C. 13S6, 1393 (1954), rev'd, 232 F2d 319
(7th Cir. 1956); Western Contracting Corp., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 371, 331 (1953),
rev'd, 271 F.2d 694 (Sth Cir. 1959); W. L Hughes, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mcm. 797, 799
(1952).
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Upon consideration of all of the evidence, it is concluded that it was the intention
of the parties to the so-called lease agreements ... that the petitioner would acquire
an equity . . . as the result of making each so-called rental payment, and that
petitioner did acquire an equity in each item.
In Benton v. Commissioner . . . and in Breece Veneer and Panel Co. v. Commds-
sioner . . . the courts took the view that it was error on the part of this Court to
give considerable weight to a "purely objective economic test" in determining
whether a particular -transaction constituted a sale or a lease. In this case, after
careful consideration of the entire record and of all of the factors, including the so-
called economic factor, we are unable to sustain petitioner's contention that the
agreements in question were intended to be, and were in fact, leases.188
The careful and elaborate character of this statement suggests that it
was drafted primarily to prevent a reversal.
Most of the appeals in this area have gone to the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. It has four times denied deductibility of purported
rentals 3 ' and twice has held that the "lessor" was entitled to capital
gains treatment.140 In all these cases, it has held that a transaction in
the form of a lease was really a sale.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit purports to follow a test
of intention, but it seems to determine intention from economic factors.14 1
It has cited as authority both the Benton case, 141 which rejected the
economic test, and the Judson Mills 4 3 and Chicago Stoker Corp. 44
decisions, in which the Tax Court developed the economic test. 45
This interpretation of the approach of the Ninth Circuit seems
supported by a statement of a district court within its jurisdiction. In
Elliot v. Robinson,48 a lessor-taxpayer was allowed to treat receipts
under a transaction in the form of a lease as the proceeds of a sale. The
court said that "the greater weight of authority seems to hold that the
parties here intended to enter into an agreement for the sale of the
property described therein."' 4 This statement would be inappropriate
138. Western Contracting Corp., supra note 137, at 384.
139. Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959); Beus v. Commissioner, 261
F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Haggard v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Oester-
reich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955). In Oesterreich v. Commissioner, supra,
both the "lessor" and the "lessee" were parties, so that the denial of deductibility to the
"lessee" meant extension of the benefit of capital gain treatment to the "lessor,"
140. Robinson v. Elliot, 262 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1958); Oesterreich v. Commissioner,
supra note 139.
141. Rosenfeld, Leases With Options to Purchase, U. So. Cal. 12th Tax Inst. 655, 660
(Ervin ed. 1960).
142. 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952).
143. 11 T.C. 25 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cum. Bull. 2.
144. 14 T.C. 441 (1950).
145. Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798, 801, 802-03 (9th Cir. 1955).
146. 57-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 58063 (D. Mont. 1957), aff'd, 262 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1958).
147. Id. at 58065.
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if the court were primarily concerned with the subjective, actual intent
of the parties.
In discussing the proper test, the Ninth Circuit said:
It seems well settled that calling such a transaction a "lease" does not ma!e it
such, if in fact it is something else .... To determine just 'what it is the courts will
look to see what the parties intended it to be .... [T]he test should not be what the
parties call the transaction nor even what they may mistakenly believe to be the
name of such transaction. What the parties believe the legal effect of such a trans-
action to be should be the criterion. If the parties enter into a transaction 'which they
honestly believe to be a lease but which in actuality .has all the elements of a
contract of sale, it is a contract of sale and not a lease no matter 'what they call
it nor how they treat it on their boo'ks. We must looh, therefore, to the intent of
the parties in terms of -what they intended to happcn.1 4
The italicized statements above are inconsistent. What the parties
intend to be the legal effect of their transaction and what they expect to
do may be entirely different. Legally, a "lessee" may be free to exercise
an option to buy or not, but the rentals and option price may be so
rigged that he cannot afford not to buy. In such a case, the transaction
ought to be treated as a sale. Hence, the second test seems to be more
sound.
In addition to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, only two courts of appeals
have passed on this question. The Seventh Circuit, in Breece Vcizcr &
Panel Co. v. Comwissioner,"'1 allowed the taxpayer to deduct purported
rentals. There the payments were not more than a fair rental, the option
price was substantial, and some decline in value might have been expected.
The court cited Benton for the proposition that the economic test is only
one factor bearing on the intention of the parties, 'a but it was careful to
point out that this case might be distinguished from other cases on the
basis of that test. In Western Contracthzg Corp. v. Comiwssioncr,';'
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit allowed the deduction where
there was no express option to buy. There it was customary in the par-
ticular industry to give a lessee the privilege of buying, but there was
no evidence that the lessee knew of the custom nor any showing that the
custom had become an implied term of the contract.'15
14S. Oesterrelch v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 793, .01-02 (9th Cir. 1955). (Empbatis
added.)
149. 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956).
150. Id. at 323.
151. 271 F.2d 694 (Sth Cir. 1959).
152. Id. at 701. The court cited, apparently with approval, Abramson v. Tinitcd Statcz,
133 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Iowa 1955), but in effect seems to have overrued it. In Abramzon,
supra, the ta.payer-lessee bought equipment from its lwzr, v.ithout any prior agre,.:ment
giving it an option, and was given credit against the purchase price for rentaL alr dy paid.
The district court disallowed deduction of rentals zo crcditcd, although it found that the
lessee had no equit3 or title in the property when it paid the rentalb and cpehe with
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Perhaps there is less conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Fifth
and Seventh Circuits than may appear. Where the option price was
substantial but below the fair market value of the property, the Ninth
Circuit has twice denied deductibility of rent.1 3 The Fifth5 4 and
Seventh Circuits' 55 have allowed the deduction in such cases. The
difference may be in the fact that the cases before the Ninth Circuit
involved ranch or farm land, while the Benton case in the Fifth Circuit
concerned a taxi business and Breece, in the Seventh Circuit, a factory.
If the transaction is concerned with personalty or improvements to
realty, there is a greater chance that the parties reasonably expected the
value of the property to drop by the time for exercise of the option. In
such a case, they can plausibly argue that the option price, without the
rents, was intended as the purchase price of the property. This em-
phasizes the point that, when the economic factors are being considered,
the market value of the property should be considered on the basis of
what the parties, when they made their agreement, might reasonably
have expected it to be at the time for exercise of the option. If, in this
light, the option price appears nominal, the parties should not expect any
court of appeals to accept the form of their agreement as decisive.
It has been thought that greater certainty and fairness might be
achieved if some leases with options to buy were treated as involving
both sales and leases. 56 A purported lease with an option to buy would
be treated as a sale if title may pass without payment of a substantial
option price. If title will pass only on payment of such a price, the
transaction would be treated as both a sale and lease, with the purported
rent treated as rent to the extent of the fair rental value of the property
and the excess treated as part payment on the purchase price of the
property. One writer has suggested that the lessor be treated as realizing
gain or loss when the option is exercised or when the excess over rental
value received exceeds his basis.5 To avoid the problem of whether to
treat the lessor's income as ordinary income or capital gain if he has
disfavor of the Government's attempt to relate the status of the parties at the time of
the sale back to the time of the making of the lease. In conjunction with this case, see
Earl L. Lester, 32 T.C. 711 (1959), where the taxpayer-lessor, under a lease with an option
to buy, was held to receive ordinary income in respect to rent paid before exercise of the
option price but credited toward that price.
153. Beus v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1958); Haggard v. Commissloncr,
241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956).
154. Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952).
155. Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956).
156. Johnson, Lessee Improvements to Leased Property and Options to Purchase, N.Y.U.
12th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 75, 96-97 (Sellin ed. 1954); Lukins, Tax Treatment of the
Lease With Option to Purchase: Is Allocation the Answer?, 11 Tax. L. Rev. 65, 74-76 (1955).
157. Johnson, op. cit. supra note 156, at 96.
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received amounts in excess of his basis, it is suggested that no gain be
taxed to the lessor with respect to amounts received in excess of rental
value until the option is exercised or expires.1'i The lessee would realize
a loss to the extent of the excess paid over rental value, if he failed to
exercise the option.
These proposals raise problems as to depreciation. Several solutions
have been suggested, with an apparent preference for apportioning
depreciation between the lessee and lessor.' The basis of the lessor
would decrease and the basis of the lessee would increase for this and
other purposes, through allocation of part of each payment of rent to
the purchase price of the property.
Opinions have differed as to whether the change should be effected by
decision, regulation or statute. c° Since the making of these proposals,
the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit have refused to allow a lessee to
allocate part of each payment to purchase price and part to rent and to
deduct the latter part.'' Under the present statute, these courts were
correct, since the deduction for rent is allowed only if the lessee has no
title or equity in the property and is not taking title to it." 2 The change
could, of course, be made by statute.
Other writers have proposed that the regulations be amended to restate
the economic test, with attention paid to the particular situation in
determining reasonable rental and reasonable option price.", The result
would be to treat the transaction either as a lease with an option to buy
or as a sale, but not as both.
It is submitted that, if substantial hardship arises because of the
present state of the law, any change should be made by statute. Regula-
tions restating the economic test would leave the law unsettled until their
validity had been litigated; they probably could not validly provide for
the treatment of a transaction as both a lease and a sale. A statute such
as the one suggested above, however, could bury the test of intention at
once and therefore eliminate the present doubts as to the weight to be
158. Lulins, op. cit. supra note 156, at 75.
159. Ibid. See Johnson, op. cit. supra note 156, at 96.
160. Johnson, op. cit. supra note 156, at 97; Lulins, op. cit. cupra note 1-6, at 74.
161. Wilshire Holding Corp., IS CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 62 (1953), r.vd, 262 F2d 51
(9th Cir. 195S). The Ninth Circuit had earlier suggested the taxpayer's apprcach, in an-
other stage of the same litigation, when it stated that part uf each payment was going
toward acquisition of the property. Oesterreich v. CommLioner, 226 F2d 79,1, 193 (9th
Cir. 1955). "Lessees," however, have been allowed to deduct part of each paymcnt as in-
terest on the purchase price. Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959), rcvcrci,-
30 T.C. 356 (195S); Wilshire Holding Corp., supra; Schwarz v. United State:, CO-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 76277 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
162. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a)(3).
163. Blumenthal & Harrison, The Tax Treatment of the Lmase With an Option to Pur-
chase, 32 Texas L. Rev. S39, S70 (1954).
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given the intention of the parties and the factors from which it is to be
found. The law seems to be clear enough that, if only a nominal option
price is required, the transaction is a sale. A statute could remove
any uncertainty concerning what is nominal by treating as a sale any
lease with an option to buy at a price less than some stated percentage
of the value of the property as of the time for exercise of the option.
There would still be uncertainty and a source of litigation in the deter-
mination of rental value and fair market value. The statute could,
however, protect both the Government and the taxpayer in many cases
from the present risk that the payments will be treated wholly as rent or
purchase price (apart from the element of interest). The proposed
statute would seem to treat all parties fairly; whether it would reduce
litigation depends on whether the present source of litigation is doubt
as to the legal test or disagreements about rental value and fair market
value.
VI. WHETHER IMPROVEMENTS ERECTED BY A LESSEE ARE RENTAL
INCOME TO THE LESSOR
The apparent answer to when, if ever, improvements erected by a
lessee are rental income to a lessor has changed several times.
In 1917, the Treasury ruled that the value of such improvements is
rental income to the lessor at the termination of the lease.1 14 In Miller
v. Gearin,'65 the Ninth Circuit rejected this ruling, on the ground that
the lessor realized income from the improvements, if at all, on their
erection, when he received title to them and the value of his property
was enhanced.-1 6
After Miller v. Gearin, the Treasury amended its regulations to
provide that the discounted value of the improvements as of the termina-
tion of the lease was income to the lessor in the year of erection' 17 and
later to permit the lessor to amortize the value of the improvements over
the remaining term. The new provisions were approved by a number of
decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals.1 Apparently, the Treasury's
164. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 465 & n.3 (1940).
165. 258 Fed. 225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 667 (1919).
166. In Miller v. Gearin, the lease expressly provided that the lessor should get title to
all improvements on erection. Id. at 226. However, this does not appear to be an essen-
tial condition to the holding. See Lewis v. Pope Estate Co., 116 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 19,10),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 630 (1941). Nor did the Ninth Circuit emphasize the fact that the
improvements had been erected before the sixteenth amendment was enacted. Cryan v.
Wardell, 263 Fed. 248, 249 (N.D. Cal. 1920), held that any income realized under such
facts could not constitutionally be taxed.
167. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 465 & n.5 (1940).
168. Julia Willms Sloan, 36 B.T.A. 370 (1937); Emma C. Morphy, 35 B.T.A. 289
(1937); Cataract Ice Co., 23 B.T.A. 654 (1931), acq., X-2 Cum. Bull. 12 (1931); Joseph
L. B. Alexander, 13 B.T.A. 1169 (1928).
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theory was that improvements by a lessee which have a life longer than
the remaining term are additional rent.
The new provisions were rejected by the Second Circuit in 1935...
and by the Supreme Court in 1938.1' One ground for these decisions
was that the value of the improvements was not rent, under a definition
of rent as "a fixed sum, or property amounting to a fixed sum, to be paid
at stated times for the use of property."'' In the Supreme Court case,
the lessee had no duty to make specific improvements or to make them
at any particular time. Another ground for the decisions was a lack of
realization, since there was no separation of income from capital.' 2
The regulations also provided that, if the lessor elected to report the
value of improvements pro rata over the term of the lease and the lease
terminated prematurely, he should report the balance of that value for
the year of termination.1 73 Therefore, the Government was still main-
taining, at least in some cases, that a lessor realized income on termina-
tion of a lease because of improvements erected by the lessee. The lower
courts uniformly held against the Government, but the Supreme Court
held, in Helvering v. Bruz,.n, 75 that income can be so realized. The Court
did not discuss the question of whether the value of the improvements
could be considered rent, but, by reference to the analogy of exchanges,
it rejected for this context the notion that realization of income requires
separation of income from capital.'Y, The Third Circuit interpreted this
decision as rendering it immaterial whether the value of the improve-
ments might be considered rent.1 77 Income realized under this decision
was ordinary income, not capital gain,' 78 since the transaction did not
involve a sale or exchange.70
169. Hewitt Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d SS0 (2d Cir. 1935), rcvCrrng 29
B.T.A. 1205 (1934).
170. M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U.S. 267, r.vcr2lng 87 Ct. Cl. 413, 23 F. Supp.
461 (1933).
171. Id. at 277.
172. Id. at 279; Hewitt Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d C20, K34 (:d Cir. 1935).
173. TI). 42S1, V I-2 Cum. Bull. 244 (1929); 2 'Mcrtn, Federal Incme T.a-vtion
§ 11.15 (Zimet & Stanley rev. 1955).
174. Commissioner v. Center Inv. Co., 103 F.2d 1Q0 (9th Cir. 1939), rcv*, 3O U.S.
639 (1940); Commissioner v. Wood, 107 F.2d S69 (7th Cir. 1939), rev'd, 30) X.S. 637
(1940); Helvering v. Bruun, 105 F.2d 442 (Sth Cir. 1939), rc-vd, 39 ULS. 461 (1940);
Nicholas v. Fifteenth St. Inv. Co., 105 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1939).
175. 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
176. Id. at 463-69.
177. Gowern's Estate v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d S3, 04 (3d Cir. 1041).
178. Estate of Austin C. Brant, 44 B.T.A. 1306 (1941), nonacq. sub nom. Etate of
Harriet Frances Whiting, 1941-2 Cum. Bull. 15, 25; Estate of William F. Marl'ham, 2
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 244 (1943). Accord, Stricher Co., 3 CCH Tax Ct. Ien. 1131 (1044).
179. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222.
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Congress was soon urged to overrule the Bruun decision. It was
argued that the decision would cause hardship to lessors. Several argu-
ments advanced were: that a lessor might be treated as having
realized income, although the value of the improved property might be
less than his cost or its value at the commencement of the term; that the
tax might be very large in some industries, such as railroads, because
most of the improvements would typically have been purchased by the
lessee; and that the transaction would not provide the lessor with any
cash for paying the tax. 180 Congress did enact a provision excluding from
gross income "income, other than rent, derived by a lessor of real prop-
erty upon the termination of a lease, representing the value of such
property attributable to buildings erected or other improvements made
by the lessee."' 8
The new statute had both advantages and disadvantages. The lessor
obtained the benefit, generally, of receiving property of greater value
and earning power than he had before making the lease, without pres-
ently paying any tax. 82 His basis for depreciation and computation of
gain or loss on a future sale would not include the value of the im-
provements1ea On the other hand, any such gain might be treated as
capital,184 and, if an individual, he might keep the property until death
gave him a stepped-up basis. 85
In the new statute, the phrase "other than rent" left open the pos-
sibility that the value of improvements might sometimes be taxed as
rental income to the lessor. Apparently, Congress assumed that this
would be governed by M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States,18 which said
that the value of improvements would not be taxed to the lessor on
erection unless they were intended as rent. This position has been
consistent with that of the Treasury Department.'87
There is some uncertainty as to when the value of improvements
180. Hearings on Revenue Revision of 1941 Before the Committee on Ways and Means,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 233 (1941).
181. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(b) (11), 56 Stat. 812 (now Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 109).
182. Morehead, Newer Thinking on Real Estate Transactions, N.Y.U. 7th Inst. on
Fed. Tax. 1036, 1039 (1949).
183. Greenberger, Tax Consequences of Tenant Improvements to Real Estate, N.Y.U.
15th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 351, 353 (Sellin ed. 1957).
184. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231.
185. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014 (a); Greenberger, Tax Consequences of Tenant
Improvements to Real Estate, N.Y.U. 15th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 351, 353 (Sellin ed.
1957).
186. 305 U.S. 267, 277 (1938). See Commissioner v. Cunningham, 258 F.2d 231, 233 (9th
Cir. 1958).
187. Treas. Reg. § 1.109-1; I.T. 4009, 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 13.
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will be found to have been intended as rent. When such value has been
credited against rent, the lessee has been allowed to deduct the cost 3
and the lessor has been taxed.'10 A jury was allowed to find, however,
that the parties did not intend improvements as rent when the lessee
was required to pay a percentage rental and also to erect certain
improvements at a given cost or pay the deficiency to the les-
sor.190 The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that, if a lessee is re-
quired to make improvements but not to pay any cash rental, the value
of the improvements is rental income of the lessor. However, the
Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit have ruled that a lessor, the majority
stockholder of a lessee which paid no cash rent, realized no such income
from the improvements, on the basis of her testimony that she did not
intend to charge rent and that the improvements would be of use only
to this particular lessee. 191 It would seem that, if the value of improve-
ments is not meant to be treated as rent, a cash rent should be charged
and no credit should be given because of the improvements.
If an improvement is found to be rent, the lessee may have a problem
as to when he can deduct its cost. A lessee under a ten-year lease was
allowed to deduct in full for the year of construction the cost of improve-
ments which were less than a year's rent; a credit was given under the
lease for such cost.'9 2 It has been argued, however, that a lessee might
have to prorate the cost over the remaining term if the cost were high
and the term long.'93 Two Tax Court decisions have permitted 01 or re-
quired"'a a lessee to amortize the cost of an improvement over the life
of a lease. This result would be consistent with cases holding that
lessees could deduct other types of expenditures only over the remain-
ing term of a lease.1'0
18. Your Health Club, Inc., 4 T.C. 335 (1944), acq., 1945 Cum. Bull. 7.
1S9. Brown v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1955).
190. Neel v. United States, 57-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 56731 ( ID. Ga. 1957).
191. Grace H. Cunningham, 23 T.C. 670 (1957), affd, 253 F.d 231 (9th Cir. 1953),
acq., 1958-2 Cur. Bull. 4. There is a danger that the value of improvemcnts will N,- trcated
as a dividend distributed to a stockholder-lessor. Jaeger Motor Car Corp., 17 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1093 (1953).
192. Your Health Club, Inc., 4 T.C. 3M5 (1944), acq., 1945 Cum. Bull. 7.
193. Schlesinger, Consequences to Lessor of Lesce Construct ,n, N.Y.V. 17th Inzt. on
Fed. Tax. 697, 703-04 (Sellin ed. 1959).
194. Jos. N. Neel Co., 22 T.C. 10I3 (1954), acq., 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 5.
195. Oppenstein Bros., 1 B.T.A. 259 (1924).
196. Southwestern Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 626 (5th Cih. 1940), ccrt.
denied, 312 U.S. 703 (1941); Mlain & McKinney Bldg. Co. v. CommsAionner, 113 F2d 1
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 6S3 (1940); John D. Fadcler, 39 B.T.A. 395 (1939), acq.,
1939-1 Cum. BulL 11.
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VII. PAYMENT BY A LESSEE FOR CANCELLATION OF A LEASE
If a lessee pays a sum to his lessor in consideration of cancellation
of the lease, the payment is taxable income to the lessor, on the theory
that it is a substitute for rent.197 Such income is ordinary, since the
lessor has made no sale.198 Depending on the accounting method of the
taxpayer, the income is taxable to the lessor1 99 and deductible by the
lessee 2 ° in the year of payment or accrual.
VIII. PAYMENTS UNDER LEASEBACK ARRANGEMENTS
Are payments made under the various types of leasebacks deductible?
The statutory question is whether the payments are "ordinary and neces-
sary expenses . . .rentals .. .required .. .as a condition to the . . .
use or possession ...of property .... ,201 There is no answer which
covers all types of situations. The statute is inconclusive, if it is pos-
sible to read into it the step-transaction doctrine and the business pur-
pose test. The result seems to depend on how clearly a tax avoidance
motive appears from the facts and how strongly the court reacts to the
existence of that motive.
If a court which feels a strong desire to prevent tax avoidance en-
counters a leaseback effected primarily to avoid taxes, it can readily dis-
allow deductibility of the rent. It can treat the transfer of legal title
from the taxpayer and the leaseback to him as one transaction, under
the step-transaction doctrine, and then hold that the "rent" paid is not
an "ordinary and necessary expense" or is not "required." The payment
could be said to be not "ordinary" on the ground that businessmen do
not usually transfer property to others and then pay rent to them when
they could continue to use the property without paying rent. It could
be held not to be "necessary" because not helpful to a business. Simi-
larly, the payment can be held not "required" if the transaction is
viewed as a whole.
On the other hand, a court may consider only the situation existing
after the transfer and allow the deduction. Rent is generally an "ordi-
nary and necessary" expense of a business, and usually one who wishes
to use property owned by another is "required" to pay rent. Con-
sequently, a court which refuses to apply the step-transaction doctrine
197. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
198. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222; Spencer Thorpe, 42 B.T.A. 654 (1940), appeal dis-
missed per curiam, 121 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1941); Walter M. Hort, 39 B.T.A. 922, 926,
aff'd per curiam, 112 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
199. King Varick Corp., 11 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 32 (1942); Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(b) (1957).
200. Cassatt v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1943), affirming 47 B.T.A. 400
(1942); C. Ludwig Baumann & Co., 2 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 188 (1943).
201. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a)(3).
[Vol. 29
RENT DETERMINATION
will tend to allow the deduction. Without using the step-transaction
doctrine, a court can rationally deny the deduction if the relationship
of the taxpayer and the lessor is such that the property might easily be
transferred back to the taxpayer. In such a situation the payment of
rent may not be "required." Similarly, if the rent were unreasonable,
the excess over what might be paid a stranger for the use of similar
property could be held not "required."
The problem of deducting rentals paid pursuant to transfers and
leasebacks between related parties will be considered herein. The liti-
gation concerning the deductibility of rent seems to have involved re-
lated parties. There have been tax problems in respect to leasebacks
between unrelated parties, but these dealt with recognition of losses. - -
Several types of transactions can give rise to our problem. There may
be a transfer between members of a family, by sale or by gift directly or
in trust. A corporation may transfer property to a shareholder, as a
dividend or by a sale.
The most favorable situation for the taxpayer arises if he transfers
property in trust and takes a leaseback. Here, the courts have held that
he may deduct the "rental" paid to the trust.y' They have ignored the
step-transaction doctrine and have viewed the situation only as it appears
after the transfer in trust. On the ground that the trustee is independent
of the transferor, they have held that the "rental" is "required" and
deductible. Some of the cases have also stressed the fact that the tax-
payer was paying no more than a reasonable rental to the trust. " ' The
earlier Tax Court decisions had disallowed the deduction, largely on
the ground that, under the step-transaction doctrine, the payments were
not "required." 2'c5 The later Tax Court decisions follow the Seventh
and Third Circuits and allow the deduction.2 O Recently the Tax Court
disallowed the deduction,2 17 but the facts were unusual, since the trans-
feror had control over the trustees and power to retake the corpus at
will for nothing.
202. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959); Ccntury Elec.
Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (Sth Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
203. Consolidated Apparel Co. v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 50 (7th Cir. 1953), rcvering
17 T.C. 1570 (1952); Brown v. Commissioner, 10 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), ccrt. dnied, 340
U.S. 814 (1950), reversing 12 T.C. 1095 (1949); Slemp v. Commissioncr, 163 F-2d 593
(7th Cir. 1943), reversing S T.C. 415 (1947); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 21,0 (1956), acq,
1957-2 Cure. Bull. 6; Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954), nonacq., 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 10.
204. Consolidated Apparel Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 203; Albert T. Fdis, cupra
note 203.
205. Helen C. Brown, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949); A. A. Skeimp, 3 T.C. 415 (1947).
205. John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956), acq., 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 6; Albert T. Felix, 21
T.C. 794 (1954), nonacq., 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 10.
207. Burroughs Corp., 33 T.C. 339 (1959).
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The Internal Revenue Service still maintains that the payments are
not deductible. It argues that the trustee is not really independent when
the leaseback is prearranged, as it nearly always will be.2 " Thus,
a taxpayer who attempts a gift in trust and leaseback may still have to
litigate to obtain his deduction.
The cases dealing with a gift not in trust and a leaseback have denied
the deduction. ° These cases have been decided on various grounds,
such as continued actual control by the donor,210 the payment of un-
reasonable rent,2 ' the probability of control of the donee by the donor
by reason of the marital relationship,212 and lack of business purpose.21 3
Why is there a different result in the cases involving a direct gift from
that in the cases of a gift in trust? The answer may lie in a conflict of
authority among the circuits. The trust cases have been decided in the
Third and Seventh Circuits. Two direct gift cases, Kirschenmann v.
Westover2 14 and Finley v. Commissioner,"' might be distinguished from
the trust cases on the ground of special facts: unreasonableness of the
"rent" paid in the first case and retained control in the second. White
v. Fitzpatrick,"6 however, stresses the lack of an independent trustee.
Should the lack of a trustee matter? Presumably, the argument is that
a trustee has a duty to the beneficiary to make the most profitable use
he can of the trust property, that he cannot allow the transferor to have
the free use of that property, and that therefore the transferor is "re-
quired" to pay rent.2 7 This argument is sound, however, only if the
trust has minor or unascertained beneficiaries, since adult beneficiaries
can waive their rights by consenting to what otherwise would be a breach
of trust. 18 Thus, if the direct gift is suspect because of the family re-
208. Rev. Rul. 9, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 20, modified on other grounds, Rev. Rul. 315,
1957-2 Cum. Bull. 624. See also Webster, Transfers to Trusts With Leasebacks--Drafting and
Other Suggestions for the Trust and Lease Agreements, U. So. Cal. 8th Tax Inst., 319,
330 & n.27 (Ervin ed. 1956).
209. Finley v. Commissioner, 255 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1958), affirming 27 T.C. 413
(1956); Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834
(1955), affirming 53-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 47173 (S.D. Cal. 1952); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d
398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952); Raymond M. Cassidy, 10 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 573 (1951), where the point was moot.
210. Finley v. Commissioner, supra note 209.
211. Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834
(1955), affirming 53-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 47173 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
212. White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952).
213. Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834
(1955); White v. Fitzpatrick, supra note 212.
214. Note 213 supra.
215. 255 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1958), affirming 27 T.C. 413 (1956).
216. 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert denied, 343 U.S. 928 (1952).
217. 2 Scott, Trusts § 181 (2d ed. 1956).
218. 2 Scott, op. cit. supra note 217, § 216.
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lationship of the donor and donee, so is the gift in trust for the benefit
of a member of the donor's immediate family, unless the beneficiary is
a minor or unascertained. In most of the trust cases, at least some of
the beneficiaries were minors. -0 Thus, the trustees had duties to produce
income and could not avoid liability for breach of these duties by obtain-
ing the consent of the beneficiaries. In Co;zsolidated Apparel Co. v.
Comzmzissioner, 2 ° however, the beneficiaries were adults. The factor of
intervention of a trustee does not seem, of itself, sufficient to sustain
that decision. There was evidence of arm's length negotiations between
the trustee and the taxpayer as to the amount of the rent, which the
court relied on as showing independence of the trustee.
In the area of corporate distributions with leasebacks, it appears that
the taxpayer will have to litigate his right to a deduction for rent at
least up to a court of appeals. The Tax Court has disallowed the de-
duction in the cases brought before it.22 ' It has applied the step-trans-
action doctrine and then, looking at the situation as a whole, has said
that there was no corporate business purpose for the transaction and
therefore that the payment was not an ordinary and necessary business
expense.
At first, the Seventh Circuit, in Ingle Coal Corp. v. Comnissioncr2-,
followed the Tax Court. There, as part of a tax avoidance plan, a family
corporation was liquidated. A lease of coal mining lands was distributed
by it to its stockholders and transferred by them to a new corporation,
which agreed to pay them a royalty. Deduction of the royalty was dis-
allowed. Using the step-transaction doctrine, the court held that the
royalty was not an ordinary and necessary business expense, since the
old corporation could have continued to mine, under the lease, without
paying royalties. Skemp v. Cornrmissio;r"I was distinguished on the
ground that there the taxpayer had transferred the property to an in-
dependent trustee and could use the property only by paying rent, while
here the stockholders could always terminate the duty of the new cor-
poration to pay rent.
Later, the Seventh Circuit seems to have changed its mind. In Stearns
Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Comrnissioner,2 1 it allowed a corporation to deduct
219. E.g., Brov'n v. Commissioner, 10 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), ccrt. dcnicd, 340 U.S. 314
(1950), reversing 12 T.C. 1095 (1949); Skemp v. Commissioncr, 16S F.2d 593 (7th Cir.
1943), reversing S T.C. 415 (1947); John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 2C (1956), acq., 1957-2 Cum.
Bull. 6; Albert T. Felis, 21 T.C. 794 (1954), nonacq., 1956-2 Cum. BulL 10.
220. 207 F.2d 5S0 (7th Cir. 1953), reversing 17 T.C. 1570 (1952).
221. Granberg Equip., Inc., 11 T.C. 704 (194S); Ingle Coal Corp., 10 T.C. 1199 (1943),
aff'd, 174 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949); Stearns Magnetic Mifg. Co., 11 CCH Tax Ct. Acm.
535 (1952), rev'd, 208 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1954).
222. 174 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1949), affirming 10 T.C. 1199 (1943).
223. 16S F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1943).
224. 203 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1954), reversing 11 CCH Ta% Ct. Mfem. 535 (1952).
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royalties paid by it to stockholders for the use of a patent which the
corporation had distributed to the stockholders. There was some evi-
dence that the transaction had a business purpose. However, the court
expressly rejected reliance on the business purpose test and said that the
test was whether the royalties were reasonable. By implication, the court
cast aside the step-transaction doctrine and applied the test of whether
the payment was "required" only in the light of facts existing after the
distribution. The court relied on the Skemp case, which it had dis-
tinguished in Ingle Coal Corp., and purported to distinguish the latter
case on the ground that there the stockholders were only a conduit of
title from one corporation to another, a minor ground mentioned by the
court in Ingle Coal Corp. The court also emphasized the apparently
immaterial fact that the taxpayer was solvent and that its creditors were
not damaged by the distribution of the patent to the stockholders.
No other court of appeals has yet dealt with this problem. The Fifth20
and Ninth Circuits220 have, however, ruled on a sale by a corporation to
its stockholders followed by a leaseback to the corporation, indicating
that they might deny the deduction in the case of a corporate distribution
and leaseback. Both cases involved corporations operating in a period
of improving business and rising earnings. Neither paid cash dividends.
The sale and leaseback transactions were entered into under obviously
sham recitals of corporate financial needs or condition. In both cases
the Tax Court applied the step-transaction doctrine and denied a deduc-
tion for rent.227 One case was affirmed in a per curiam opinion by the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; the other was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the ground of lack of business
purpose.28
The attitude expressed in these cases seems contrary to that of the
Seventh Circuit in Stearns Magnetic Mfg. Co.2 ' The fact that they
involved sales to stockholders rather than distributions does not seem to
be an adequate basis for a distinction. A distinction might be based on
the clear tax avoidance motive and lack of business purpose in the
cases which came before the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, although the
225. W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951).
226. Shaffer Terminals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952), affirming 16
T.C. 356 (1951).
227. Shaffer Terminals, Inc., supra note 226; Catherine G. Armston, 12 T.C. 539 (1949),
aff'd sub nom. W. H. Armston Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951).
228. The Tax Court has also denied the deduction in the case of a purported sale and
leaseback between related corporations. Riverpoint Lace Works, Inc., 13 CCH Tax. Ct.
Mem. 463 (1954). There, so many factors tended to show that the transaction was a sham
that the decision does not seriously test the business purpose doctrine, although the court
did mention it.
229. 208 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1954), reversing 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 535 (1952).
[Vol. 29
RENT DETERMINTATION
Seventh Circuit expressly refused to rely on the existence of a business
purpose. In the future there may be a shift which will bring the various
circuits to agreement. The Tax Court has accepted Brown v. Commis-
sioner"3 0 and the Skemp decisions.2 31 This may indicate a trend which
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits will follow.
Another question which may arise is whether rent can be deducted
pursuant to a sale and leaseback between members of a family. This
point has not been litigated and may never be, since the cases involving
gifts in trust with a leaseback seem so far to provide a fairly safe cover
for tax avoidance. The closest case to this problem was H. W. Find-
ley, 2 2 a Tax Court memorandum decision, which held that the taxpayer
could not be taxed on the income of property which he had sold to
other members of his family or to trusts for their benefit. The purchasers
had leased the property to third persons and had received in return
rental income. The Tax Court relied on the Brown and Skcinp cases
as to the transaction with the trust and on the fact that the taxpayer
had not exercised control over the purchasers.
The present law involving leasebacks between related parties is un-
satisfactory. The distinction between transfers in trust and others will
not stand examination, except perhaps in the case of trusts with bene-
ficiaries who are minors or are otherwise incompetent. A court can
rationally allow or disallow the deduction for rent, depending on the
strength of its emotional reaction to tax avoidance possibilities.
It seems that this is a situation which should be considered by
Congress. There can be some questions of degree relating to specific
sets of fact here, as, for example, in the determination of how much
control the transferor retained over the property. A taxpayer who is
well-advised, however, can frame a leaseback so that the transferee
appears to be independent in making the lease. A court may suspect
that the parties have made an arrangement to suit the transferor and
that they will remake it if he later so desires, but there may be little
evidence on which to base a finding to that effect. Thus, we are dealing
basically with a general question of whether the possibility of tax avoid-
ance without a real change in economic circumstances is so bad here
that the deduction for rent should be disallowed.
This writer is not fully committed to any specific statutory change.
Some inquiry should be made of the extent to which the leaseback is
being used to avoid taxes, how it is being so used, and whether its use
230. 10 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. S14 (1950), revezing 12 T.C. 1695
(1949).
231. John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 20D (1956), acq., 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 6; Albert T. Flix,
21 T.C. 794 (1954), nonacq., 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 10.
232. 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mlem. 363 (1951).
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is increasing. We should consider also that generally a taxpayer can
give away income-producing property without remaining taxable on the
income. For example, a doctor owning his building could give it to a
member of his family and move his own offices to a building owned by
an unrelated party. There is little doubt that he could deduct the rent
he paid to the unrelated party and that he would not be taxed on rents
received by his donee from tenants of his old building. From this, argu-
ments can be made both ways. It is arguable that the doctor should be
allowed to deduct rent paid to a related party, because he could deduct
rent he paid to a stranger. Disallowing the deduction for rent paid to
a related party may only cause taxpayers more trouble without preventing
any tax avoidance. On the other hand, the fact that taxpayers have entered
into leasebacks with related parties when the tax results were in some
doubt tends to show that they wanted to continue their control over the
transferred property and that they thought the transferees would not
act adversely to them. Perhaps this suspicion need not be confined
to the instances in which the unique character of the property makes it
a certainty.233
On the whole, the writer would favor a statute barring the deduction
for rent paid to a related party pursuant to a leaseback. The statute
might apply only to rent paid under a lease made within a set number of
years after the transfer. It could be patterned generally after section
267(a) (1).234 Such a statute should be definite enough to avoid raising
substantial uncertainty and litigation.
There might be some desire for a more flexible statute, so as to give
a deduction for rent to the taxpayer who enters a leaseback transaction
for a nontax motive, such as a desire to increase working capital23l Thus,
the proposed statute might make an exception for the taxpayer who
proves that the transaction was not entered primarily to avoid income
taxes. Such a statute would avoid present uncertainty as to the law in
this area relating to tax avoidance motives, but it would raise un-
certainties of fact in particular cases, especially since any intelligent
taxpayer will give some consideration to the tax aspects of a proposed
transaction. It seems doubtful, therefore, that the added flexibility would
be worth the price. Greater certainty could be obtained by excepting only
leasebacks pursuant to transfers for full consideration in money or
money's worth. This would not allow a deduction for rent if the trans-
fer were by gift or corporate distribution, but it might allow a deduc-
tion in most of the cases dealing with a nontax motive.
233. E.g., White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928
(1952).
234. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 267(a)(1).
235. The increased working capital would come from a sale preceding the leaseback.
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If Congress will not enact a statute dealing with this problem, the
courts should reconsider their own position. Congressional refusal to
act may be taken as an indication that there is no national policy barring
deduction of rent paid pursuant to a leaseback. In that case, the con-
cept of the independence of the trustee should be dropped and the
question should be only whether there has been a complete transfer
and a payment of no more than a reasonable rent. The step-trancaction
approach and the business purpose doctrine might be used to justify a
close look at the facts bearing on completeness, but, if a complete trans-
fer is found, the deduction should be allowed.
LX. BoN.UsEs
The treatment of bonuses paid by lessees to lessors involves two
problems. First, how should the lessor and lessee treat bonuses for tax
purposes? Second, how are bonuses distinguished from other payments?
Payments which are conceded to be bonuses will be discussed first, in
order to show the motives for attempting to disguise the payment of a
bonus.
A bonus is a payment made by a lessee to a lessor in addition to
regular periodic payments of rent. It is usually paid when the lease is
executed or at or near the beginning of the term. The term "advance
rental" also is used, although the writer recalls no technical distinction
in the cases between "bonuses" and "advance rentals." The latter term
could be confined to payments which are to be credited against specific
installments of rent to become due in the future. The tax treatment of
"bonuses" and "advance rentals" has been the same, however, so that
distinguishing them may be unnecessary.-2 30
The tax treatment of bonuses should be compared and contrasted with
the tax treatment of ordinary rentals. Rentals paid in the course of busi-
ness are deductible by the lessee and taxable to the lessor, " 7 at times
dependent upon the accounting method of the taxpayer. It should be
kept in mind that an accrual method taxpayer generally must include
unearned income on receipt.23s Bressner Radio Co. v. Comwissioner2 '
which permitted a television dealer to defer income from service con-
tracts, casts doubt on this principle and may well affect the treatment
of advance rentals.
Usually the execution of the lease, the start of the term, and the pay-
ment of the advance rental occur in a single taxable year. The pay-
236. A distinction may develop if Bressner Radio, Inc. v. CommiEioncr 267 F.2d 520
(2d Cir. 1959), stands and is extended to landlord-tenant situations.
237. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 61, 162.
233. Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 10 (1957), affirming 230 F-2d SSS
(6th Cir. 1956), affirming 20 T.C. 1033 (1953); Automobile Club, Inc., 32 T.C. & (1959).
239. 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959), reverzing 23 T.C. 373 (1957).
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ment is includible by the lessor in that year, regardless of his account-
ing method.240 Such would be expected in the case of a cash method
lessor.2"' An accrual method lessor might, however, argue reasonably
that a bonus is earned over the whole term and should be included
ratably over it, or that an advance rental, to be applied to the rent for
certain months, should be treated as income for those months. The
result has been contrary,242 although the Tax Court has conceded that
taxing the whole of a bonus or advance rental on receipt does not fit
good commercial accounting practice.243 It has relied on precedent and
the notion that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has discretion to
determine whether a method of reporting income clearly reflects in-
come.244 The Supreme Court has said: "Section 41 vests the Com-
missioner with discretion to determine whether the petitioner's method
of accounting clearly reflects income."2 4' The Internal Revenue Code
does not say, however, that the Commissioner has such discretion but
only that "if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income,
the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in
the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income .... ),240
Hence, it is argued that a court has authority to determine whether the
taxpayer's method clearly reflects income and that it need accept the
method prescribed by the Commissioner only if it has first determined
for itself that the taxpayer's method is faulty.2 47 It is argued further that
the Supreme Court in fact has decided this question for itself.24 8 The
Second Circuit did so in the Bressner case.
Occasionally a lease is executed and a bonus or advance rental is
paid in one year but the term begins in a later year. Both cash 249 and
240. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(b) (1957).
241. Renwick v. United States, 87 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1936); Edwin B. De Golia, 40
B.T.A. 845 (1939); Andre J. Pembroke, 23 B.T.A. 1176 (1931), afi'd, 70 F.2d 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1934); James M. Butler, 19 B.T.A. 718 (1930), acq., X-2 Cum. Bull. 11 (1931); Roby
Realty Co., 19 B.T.A. 696 (1930), appeal dismissed, 62 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1933), acq.,
X-2 Cum. Bull. 60 (1931); O'Day Inv. Co., 13 B.T.A. 1230 (1928), acq., VIII-1 Cum.
Bull. 34 (1929).
242. Commissioner v. Lyon, 97 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1938); New Capital Hotel, Inc., 28
T.C. 706 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1958); Jack August, 17 T.C.
1165 (1952); C. H. Mead Coal Co., 31 B.T.A. 190 (1934); Sixteenth St. Realty Co., 10
P-H B.T.A. Mem. 1079 (1941); J. S. Garnett Co., 9 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 132 (1940).
243. New Capital Hotel, Inc., supra note 242, at 708; J. S. Garnett Co., supra note 242.
244. New Capital Hotel, Inc., supra note 242, at 709; Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(b).
245. Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 189 (1957).
246. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 446(a).
247. Berry, Who Determines Whether an Accounting System Clearly Reflects Taxable
Income?, 11 J. Taxation 79 (1959).
248. Berry, op. cit. supra note 247, at 82.
249. Renwick v. United States, 87 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1936); Roby Realty Co., 19 B.T.A.
696 (1930), appeal dismissed, 62 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1933), acq., X-2 Cum. Bull. 60 (1931).
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accrual250 method lessors have been taxed for the year of receipt. The
Bressner case may establish a contrary doctrine for accrual method tax-
payers who can prove when they will earn advance receipts. That case
might be distinguished on the ground that there the taxpayer was
obligated to furnish future services; a lessor often need furnish none.
A lessor must, however, allow the lessee to use the rented property in
the future."'- It is possible to argue that a bonus is paid to compensate
the lessor for making the lease and is not payment for the use of the
property. The answer seems to be that the lease is of no value to the
lessee without such use. -52 It is submitted that bonuses should be treated
like any prepaid income which will be earned at ascertainable times in
the future.
Here an advance payment might be treated differently from a bonus.
If an advance payment is to be applied to rent for a specific part of
the term, the lessor might be required to return it as income of that
period. This would tend to equalize the income of the lessor. It would
place on the Government the risk that the lessor may cease to be finan-
cially responsible.2 53
If a lease is executed in one year and an accrual method lessor is to
receive a bonus in a later year, when should he return it as income? An
accrual method seller has been taxed in the year of sale, although he had
no right to immediate payment until a later year. 1 Two circuits have
reached a similar result in the case of leases. 5 Other cases have reached
a contrary result, based perhaps on peculiar facts. -5
250. New Capital Hotel, Inc., 23 T.C. 706 (1957), aff'd pcr curiam, 261 F2d 437 (6th
Cir. 195s).
251. Note the argument in Fifteen Hundred Walnut St. Corp., 25 T.C. 61, 63-9 41955),
aff'd, 237 F.2d 933, 936 (3d Cir. 1956), that the taxpayer-klsor had an oblination to
furnish space to a sublessee in the future.
252. A lease stated that an advance payment was fully earned on the makin- of the
agreement and was not to be applied to future rents. jennings & Co. v. Commize ner, 51
F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1932), affirming 21 B.T.A. 331 (1930). The parties may have meant only
to make dear that the stipulated rental should not be reduced on account of the advance
payment.
253. This would apply to bonuses also if the les:or were allowcd to prorate them.
254. Shoemaker-Nash, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 B.TA, 417 (1940); Parih-Vatein &
Co., 2 B.TA. S51 (1925), acq., VI-1 Cum. Bull. 4 (1927).
255. Commissioner v. Lyon, 97 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1933), reversing S P-H B.T-.. ZIem.
497 (1936); Jennings & Co. v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 32 (9th Cir. 1932), afrming 21
B.TA. 381 (1930); United States v. Boston & P.R.R., 37 F-2d 670 (let Cir. 1930), afilrm-
ing 31 F.2d 594 (D. Mlass. 1929).
256. Fifteen Hundred Walnut St. Corp. v. CommLsioner, 237 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1996),
affirming 25 T.C. 61 (1955) (lessee to apply debt of lessor to rent, if lessor Ict a subtenant
occupy the premises); Gates v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 277 (Sth Cir. 1934), revering 26 B.T.A.
998 (1932) (notes received by lessor not treated as income until payment; no ztatement
about ta-payer's accounting method); C.G. Meaker Co., I6 T.C. 1343 (1951). acqi, 1952-1
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Although a lessor who receives an advance rental or bonus has been
required to include it in gross income not later than the year of receipt,
the lessee may not deduct it for the year of payment but only ratably
over the term of the lease.157 The basic reasoning here is that the pay-
ment is a capital expenditure for an asset, the leasehold interest, which
has a life of a number of years. This reasoning has been applied not
only to cases in which the lessee makes a single payment of a bonus or
advance rental, but also to a case in which the lessee made regular
monthly payments and also additional payments spread over only part
of the term. 5 In another case, the lessee was to make a cash payment
in advance and to pay a set sum each year for the first twenty-five
years of a ninety-nine-year lease. The same result was reached. 25  These
cases raise a question as to where the line is drawn between advance
payments which must be deducted pro rata over the whole of a term
and ordinary rentals which differ for different parts of the term. There
has not been sufficient litigation to answer that question.
Considerable litigation deals with the distinction between a bonus or
advance rental and a security deposit. The latter is not initially in-
cludible in gross income.260  Facts vary so widely that there is no
Cum. Bull. 3 (stock promised to lessor by lessee; subject to condition precedent; no ex-
press statement of lessor's accounting method).
257. Baton Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 51 F.2d 469 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 674,
affirming 19 B.T.A. 169 (1931); Galatoire Bros. v. Lines, 23 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1928),
affirming 11 F.2d 878 (E.D. La. 1926); Coronado Realty Co., 24 B.T.A. 1022 (1931);
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-11(a) (1958). A number of cases do not involve bonuses or advance
rentals paid as such directly to a lessor by a lessee but do involve similar expenditures and
rely on the same principle. Southwestern Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 686 (Sth
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 703 (1941); Main & McKinney Bldg. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 113 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 688 (1940); King Amusement Co. v.
Commissioner, 44 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 900 (1931), affirming
15 B.T.A. 566 (1930); J. Ailand & Bro. v. United States, 28 F.2d 792 (D. Mass. 1928);
Jos. N. Neel Co., 22 T.C. 1083 (1954), acq., 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 5; John D. Fackler, 39
B.T.A. 395 (1939), acq., 1939-1 Cum. Bull. 11; J. Alland & Bro., 1 B.T.A. 631 (1925);
Oppenstein Bros., 1 B.T.A. 259 (1924).
It has been suggested that a cash basis lessee may deduct an advance rent pay-
ment only in the year to which it is related. Cavitch, Leasing Real Estate: Some Income
Tax Aspects, 10 W. Res. L. Rev. 189 (1959). Such treatment seems sensible, since it would
tend to give the lessee level, though delayed, deductions for rent. It does not appear, how-
ever, to be supported by authority.
258. Southwestern Hotel Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 257.
259. Main & McKinney Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 688 (1940).
260. If a lessor is released from an obligation to repay a security deposit, he realizes
gross income. Commissioner v. Langwell Real Estate Corp., 47 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1931).
The amount is the then value of his duty to repay the deposit. Bradford Hotel Operating
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general rule for distinguishing between advance rentals and security
deposits. The Tax Court has said:
If the sum is received under a present claim of full ownership, subject to the lezors
unfettered control, and is to be applied to the rent for the last year of the term,
it is income in the year of receipt even though under certain circumstances a refund
may be required....
If, on the other hand, the sum was deposited to secure the lezzee's performance
under the lease, it is not taxable income even though the fund is deposited vith the
lessor instead of in escrow and the lessor has temporary use of the money ...
In some instances the deposit serves as security for the lessee's performance
and, in addition, if any or all of it remains during the final period of the lease, it is
to be applied to rent. It then becomes necessary to determine whether the deposit
was primarily a security payment or a prepayment of rent. ... This question of fact
is resolved by reference to the intention and acts of the parties ascertained from the
lease agreement and the circumstances incident thereto.20'
The best approach to this problem is a consideration of individual
factors and their effects. An arrangement preventing the lessor from
using the funds as his own would surely result in treatment of the funds
as a security deposit. The writer has seen no litigated case involving
such an arrangement, but a number of cases have indicated that control
of the funds by the lessor is a factor leading toward their treatment as
an advance rental. -"2 Likely, the Commissioner has not questioned the
treatment of a sum as a security deposit if it was either placed in
escrow or required to be kept in a separate account by the lessor.
Requiring the lessor to pay interest to the lessee or to allow him
credit against the rent for interest should tend toward treatment of the
principal sum as a security deposit, since it shows that the lessor re-
ceived that sum as a kind of loan. The Fifth Circuit has so held , but
the Ninth Circuit has treated the principal sum as an advance rental,
Co. v. Commissioner, 244 F.2d S76 (1st Cir. 1957), reversng 26 T.C. 454 (1956); Warren
Service Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1940), affirming 39 B.T.A. S56
(1939), acq., 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 39. From an advance rental, a lezzor realize, income only
on receipt and not on early cancellation of the lease. H. & G. Atnuesment Co., 46 B.T.A.
1095 (1942), acq., 1942-2 Cum. Bull. S.
261. John MIantell, 17 T.C. 1143, 1147-43 (1952), acq., 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 3. For
another discussion of the various possible results see Jack Shaucct, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mcm.
607 (1957).
262. Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F-2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denicd,
323 U.S. 750 (1944); Commssioner v. Lyon, 97 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1933); John Blantl,
supra note 261; Jack Shaucet, supra note 261; J. S. Garnctt Co., 9 P-H B.T.A. 'Mcm.
132 (1940).
263. Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 96S (5th Cir. 1942),
reversig 44 B.T.A. 1215 (1941). Accord, Astor Holding Co. v. CommLisoner, 135 F.2d
47 (Sth Cir. 1943).
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explaining the interest away as compensation for advance payment of
part of the rent.2 6
4
What is the effect of the existence or absence of a provision that the
lessor shall under some circumstances return the sum in question to the
lessee? Its lack has been expressly relied on to show that the sum was
an advance rental.26" 5 Other cases in which no such provision appears
have reached the same result.26  Therefore, a court will not usually find
a sum to be a security deposit if it is not to be returned.
The existence of a provision for return does not, however, conclusively
establish that the sum in question was a security deposit.26 7  An ex-
planation of the apparent inconclusiveness of this factor may be that
in the cases which treated the sum as rent there was not a provision
made in good faith for business reasons for a return in all events in the
absence of a default or breach by the lessee. In three cases, there was
to be a return only on condemnation or destruction of the property.26 8
In a fourth case, part of the advance payment was to be credited to
rent and only the excess repaid.269 In the fifth, the parties first provided
clearly for an advance rental and then, to save income taxes for the
lessor, executed a second lease which called the same sum a security
deposit and required it to be repaid in installments near the end of the
term in the same amount as installments of rent. The parties just ex-
changed checks.2 70
264. Commissioner v. Lyon, 97 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1938).
265. Jos. A. Harrah, 30 T.C. 1236 (1958); Edwin B. De Golia, 40 B.T.A. 845 (1939);
Jack Shaucet, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 607 (1957); J. S. Garnett, 9 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 132
(1940) .
266. Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943); Commissioner
v. Lyon, 97 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1938); Gilken Corp., 10 T.C. 445 (1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d
141 (6th Cir. 1949); contra, Harcum v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 650 (E.D. Va. 1958).
267. For cases involving advance rental see Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner,
143 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1944); Detroit Consol. Theatres, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1942), affirming per curiam 10 P-H B.T.A.
Mem. 874 (1941) ; New Capital Hotel, Inc., 28 T.C. 706 (1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d 437 (6th
Cir. 1958); Jack August, 17 T.C. 1165 (1952); Sixteenth St. Realty Co., 10 P-H B.T.A.
Mem. 1079 (1941). For cases involving security deposits see Clinton Hotel Realty Corp.
v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942), reversing 44 B.T.A. 1215 (1941); John
Mantell, 17 T.C. 1143 (1952), acq., 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 3; Estate of George E. Barker,
13 B.T.A. 562 (1928), acq., VIII-1 Cum. Bull. 3; Authentic Realty Co., 9 P-H B.T.A.
Mem. 624 (1940).
268. Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 267; New Capital Hotel, Inc.,
supra note 267; Sixteenth St. Realty Co., supra note 267.
269. Detroit Consol. Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1942),
affirming per curiam 10 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 874 (1941).
270. Jack August, 17 T.C. 1165 (1952). In John Mantell, 17 T.C. 1143 (1952), how-
ever, a payment was treated as a security deposit despite a correspondence between in-
stallments of rent and repayments of the purported deposit.
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Usually the parties have tried to combine a security deposit and an
advance rental by providing for an advance payment to serve as a
security deposit until the last months of the term and then to be applied
to the rent. As indicated before, the Tax Court treats the question as
one of fact as to the primary intention of the parties and tends to make
an express finding of fact.27'1 Most of the cases have concluded that the
payment was an advance rental,-2'- but a few have treated it as a
security deposit.273
What weight is accorded the language used by the parties? If they
use the phrase "advance rental," the sum in question will probably be
treated as such, but their use of the words "security deposit" will not
prevent a court from deciding that in substance the sum is an advance
rental.2 7- 1 Hence, the label given the payment is only a minor factor.
The parties may as well adopt a favorable label, but they should not
rely heavily on it.
In brief, how should the parties plan a transaction if they wish it
treated as involving a security deposit? They should refer to advance
payments as security deposits and, if possible, arrange for their segre-
gation in escrow or a separate account of the lessor. Providing for pay-
ment of interest on such payments or credit against rent on account of
interest would probably help. The deposit should not be credited against
271. New Capital Hotel, Inc., 28 T.C. 706, 707 (1957), aff'd, 261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir.
1958) ; Jack August, supra note 270, at 1167; John Mantell, supra note 270, at 1147; Jack
Shaucet, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mlem. 607, 603 (1957).
272. Gilken Corp. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949), affirming 10 T.C.
445 (1948); Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 750 (1944); Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943);
Detroit Consol. Theatres, Inc. v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 2M) (6th Cir. 1942), affirming
per curiam 10 P-H B.T.A,. Mem. 874 (1941); Commissioncr v. Lyon, 97 F-2d 70 f0th Cir.
193S); New Capital Hotel, Inc., supra note 271; Jack August, supra note 270; Edwin B.
De Golia, 40 B.T.-A. 845 (1939); jack Shaucet, supra note 271; Sixtecnth St. Realty Co.,
10 P-H B.T.A. MIem. 1079 (1941).
273. Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1942), revcrs-
ing 44 B.T.A. 1215 (1941); Harcum v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 650 (ED. Va. 1953);
John Mantell, 17 T.C. 1143 (1952), acq., 1952-1 Cum. Bull. 3; Authentic Realty Co.,
9 P-H B.T.A. Mlem. 624 (1940).
274. Where payment was held to he security deposit, with emphasis on Ianua2ge of
parties, see Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, supra note 273; JLhn Mantell,
supra note 273; Authentic Realty Co., supra note 273. For the same result, without cpcdal
mention, see Harcum v. United States, supra note 273. Where payment was held to be rent,
with emphasis on language of parties, see Joseph A. Harrah, 30 T.C. 1236 (1958); New
Capital Hotel, Inc., 23 T.C. 705 (1957), affd, 261 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1953). Where payment
was held to be rent, despite description in lease as security deposit, see Hirch Improve-
ment Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. dnied, 323 U.S. 750 (1944);
Jack August, 17 T.C. 1165 (1952).
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rent for the latter part of the term or be repaid in amounts correspond-
ing to the rent. In the absence of default, it should be returned to the
lessee. An escrow or a lien on the property could ensure such return.278
Something less than all this would probably do. It is likely that the
lessor could be allowed to use the deposit, and without interest. How
careful the parties should be depends on the degree of their eagerness
to avoid argument with the Internal Revenue Service.
Attempts have been made to disguise advance rentals as the purchase
price of a building. The owner of improved land purports to sell the
building and then leases the land to the same person. The cases have
uniformly treated the purported sale price as an advance rental."70 It
is ordinary income to the lessor,277 and he cannot deduct a loss on the
purported sale. 78 The lessee has been required to write the payment off
over the term of a ninety-nine-year lease rather than over the shorter
remaining life of the building. 79 These results seem reasonable, since it
was generally clear that the lessor did not really mean to part with his
interest in the building. There have been provisions that title to the
building should return to the lessor on termination of the lease 80 or that
the lessee should insure the building and replace it only with a building
of at least equal value.281 Attempts to make the lease and the sale of
the building appear to be separate transactions have been transparent
and ineffective.282
A related problem involves sums paid by a transferee of a leasehold
interest to his transferor. If the transfer is a sublease, a sum paid at
the time of the transfer is treated as an advance rental and taxable to
275. A lien was used in Commissioner v. Langwell Real Estate Corp., 47 F.2d 841 (7th
Cir. 1931).
276. Lindley's Trust v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1941) ; Gates v. Helvering,
69 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1934), reversing on other grounds 26 B.T.A 998 (1932); Crile v.
Commissioner, 55 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1932), affirming 18 B.T.A. 588 (1929), cert. denied,
287 U.S. 600 (1932); Coronado Realty Co., 25 B.TA. 1022 (1931); Minneapolis Syndicate,
13 B.T.A. 1303 (1928), acq., VIII-1 Cum. Bull. 31 (1929).
277. Lindley's Trust v. Commissioner, supra note 276; Gates v. Helvering, supra note
276; Crile v. Commissioner, supra note 276.
278. Crile v. Commissioner, supra note 276.
279. Coronado Realty Co., 24 B.T.A. 1022 (1931).
280. Lindley's Trust v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1941) ; Gates v. Hclverlng,
69 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1934); Minneapolis Syndicate, 13 B.T.A. 1303 (1928), acq., VIII-1
Cum. Bull. 31 (1929).
281. Lindley's Trust v. Commissioner, supra note 280; Crile v. Commissioner, 55 F.2d
804 (6th Cir. 1932); Minneapolis Syndicate, supra note 280.
282. Gates v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1934); Crile v. Commissioner, supra
note 281.
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the transferor as ordinary income. --3 If the transfer is an assignment,
the sum is treated as the sale price of the interest and may result in
capital gain or loss, depending on the character of the leasehold and
the holding period.2 s
There does not seem to be a substantial need for changes in the law
relating to bonuses and advance rentals. In some cases it is difficult
to decide whether a payment is an advance rental or a security deposit,
but the parties can readily avoid creating such situations. Taxation of
an accrual method lessor on bonuses and advance rentals seems incon-
sistent with accrual accounting, but the lessor has the use of the money,
so no hardship appears, apart from progressive rates. The lessee may
bear more hardship, since he cannot deduct a bonus or advance rental
which he has paid except ratably over the term. The result, however,
is consistent with the usual treatment of the purchase of an asset with a
life of several years.
CONCLUSION
A number of areas have been surveyed in which there is a problem
as to whether a payment is rent includible by a lessor or deductible by
a lessee, or something else. In some of these areas there have been sub-
stantial opportunities for tax avoidance. The solutions to the problems
raised have been and should be various. For example, if a lease requires
the lessee to make payments to third persons, the payments generally
must be treated as income of the lessor. This result can be reached by ap-
plying the judicially developed principle that, if a taxpayer has a right
to receive a payment and that payment would be includible in his gross
income if he received it himself, it is still includible by him, although
he directs it to another. This principle probably should not and need
not be enacted into our Internal Revenue Code. It is so much more
abstract in its terms than most provisions of the Code that it might
seem out of place if enacted. Furthermore, there is no doubt that in
general Congress would approve it, despite the exception made in sec-
tion 110 of the Code.
Another area involving opportunity for tax avoidance is that of leases
with options to buy. Here there seems to be no need for a change in
the law applicable to cases which clearly fall one way or the other.
There appears no uncertainty or injustice in the treatment of such
cases. There may, however, be uncertainty and unfairness in the close
case, where the rent is somewhat higher than a normal rent and the
2&3. Douglas Properties, Inc., 21 B.TA. 347 (1930); Rev. Rul. 537, 1957-2 Cum.
Bull. 52.
2S4. Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 31 T.C. 971 (1959), acq., 1959-2 Cune. BulL 6, rev'd,
282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960).
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option price is somewhat lower than the probable present fair market
value of the property. Here a statutory change might be useful, al-
though it would still leave open to litigation questions of rental value
and fair market value.
The area of leasebacks between related parties seems most clearly
to call for congressional consideration. The courts have made an un-
tenable distinction between transfers to independent trustees and others.
There can be a question of fact as to the completeness of a transfer,
but the basic question of policy as to deductibility of rent paid pursuant
to a transfer and leaseback is clear-cut and calls for a congressional
answer.
